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ABSTRACT 
Massachusetts product liability law is unusual. Unlike most states, Massachusetts 
does not recognize strict tort liability in the product area. Rather, “strict product 
liability” is limited to breaches of warranty under Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. The Massachusetts legislature amended Article 2 in several ways 
to provide a “strict liability” remedy that is, in the words of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, “congruent in nearly all respects with the principles” of 
strict tort liability. The court has construed the amendments to the UCC as 
precluding the adoption of strict tort liability in Massachusetts. 
In most ways, Massachusetts product liability law is in the mainstream of general 
American law. There are, however, vestiges of sales law that make that law unusual 
because of the way it developed. There are also problems of statutory interpretation 
caused by the engrafting of the concepts of strict tort liability into the contract law of 
Article 2. 
This article explores some of these problems. It argues that, by either judicial or 
legislative action, “strict product liability” should not be restricted to warranties that 
arise from a sale or lease. The article also discusses one of the remaining 
encumbrances of sales law, the requirement that a buyer give notice of a claimed 
breach of warranty to the seller or be barred from any remedy, and argues that the 
requirement does not apply to warranty beneficiaries, who are not buyers in privity 
with the seller, and that, in any event, the legislature should abolish the notice 
requirement in all warranty cases in which there has been personal injury. The article 
also discusses some of the problems of statutory interpretation caused by having two 
statutes of limitation and two notice provisions applicable to warranty claims in 
Article 2 as a result of the product liability amendments. 
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“Massachusetts codified the Restatement’s definition of 
strict liability at section 2-318 of the U.C.C. and called 
it ‘breach of warranty.’”1 
“Not!”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ife, I have often reflected, would have been a whole lot simpler if 
Massachusetts had simply behaved like a normal state3 and 
                                                          
1 Hadar v. Concordia Yacht Builders, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1082, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995). 
2 WAYNE’S WORLD (Paramount Pictures 1992). 
3 An overwhelming majority of states, by statute or judicial decision, have 
adopted a form of strict tort liability. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability 
§§ 506, 530 (West 2013). Some follow the rule of Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Prods., Inc. 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (“A manufacturer is strictly liable in 
tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used 
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a 
human being.”). Most states adopted the rule espoused in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), which provides: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or 
consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, 
and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation 
and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or 
entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 
 How “strict” is strict liability? In the case of a manufacturing defect, liability is 
truly strict. Design defects, however, have presented a much more difficult 
question, and there is a strong trend, exemplified by the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability, to apply negligence standards to design defects. See 
generally DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 450 (2d ed. 2011) 
(providing an overview of these developments); Alex Grant, The Evolution of 
Massachusetts Products Liability Law and the Conundrum of Strict Liability, 33 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing these issues under Massachusetts 
law). 
 That issue is outside the scope of this article. As used in this article, the 
expressions “strict tort liability,” “strict product liability,” and the like refer 
 
L 
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recognized strict tort liability in the product area.4 
Massachusetts did not do that, however. Instead, “strict product 
liability” in Massachusetts is based on the law of warranty.5 In most 
cases, this does not make a bit of difference. A plaintiff injured by a 
defective product will generally get the same result in Massachusetts 
as elsewhere, but not always. 
                                                                                                                                         
simply to a right to recover under the principles of either § 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts or § 1 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability as distinguished from a right to recover for breach of 
warranty. 
 Four states, in addition to Massachusetts, do not, strictly speaking, recognize the 
doctrine. 
 North Carolina’s Products Liability Act did not adopt strict liability. “There 
shall be no strict liability in tort in product liability actions.” N.C. GEN STAT. 
ANN. § 99B-1.1 (2012). 
 Delaware’s enactment of the UCC has been held to preempt judicial adoption of 
strict tort liability in cases involving sales of goods. Cline v. Prowler Inds. of 
Maryland, Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 971 (Del. 1980), but not in a bailment-lease. 
Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581, 583–87 (Del. 1976); see 
Franchetti v. Intercole Automation, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 454, 455–58 (D. Del. 
1981) (holding that there is no strict liability for injuries caused by defective 
product sold before adoption of UCC); Middlesex Mut. Assur. Co. v. Delaware 
Elec. Signal Co., C.A. No. 07C-12-005 THG, 2008 WL 4216145 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Sept. 11, 2008) (holding that UCC Art. 2A preempts strict tort liability with 
respect to leases). 
 Virginia limits recovery to the implied warranty of merchantability or a tort 
theory of negligent design. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 
1114 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988). In Childs v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1988 WL 391503 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1988), the court, 
relying in part on Cline, held that the UCC preempted strict tort liability. Id. at 
1081. 
 “Michigan has not adopted the strict liability provision of section 402A . . . . It 
has, however, adopted a tort theory of product liability which it calls the 
‘doctrine of implied warranty.’” Upjohn Co. v. Rachelle Labs., Inc., 661 F.2d 
1105, 1108 (6th Cir. 1981). 
4 Massachusetts, of course, does recognize strict tort liability in other contexts. 
E.g., Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., 323 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Mass. 
1975) (“After careful consideration, we conclude that strict liability as 
enunciated in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, is, and 
has been, the law of the Commonwealth.”); Smith v. Jalbert, 221 N.E.2d 744, 
746 (Mass. 1966) (holding that the owner or keeper of a wild animal is strictly 
liable for personal injury or property damage caused by such animal). 
5 See Hadar, 886 F. Supp. at 1096. 
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The anomalies of Massachusetts product liability law are the result 
of amendments made to the Uniform Commercial Code by the 
legislature, which the court has construed as precluding the recognition 
of strict tort liability in the product area. This has produced several 
problems of both substantive law and statutory interpretation, 
problems that could have been avoided had Massachusetts recognized 
strict tort liability. 
First, the historical development of Massachusetts law has left a 
gap in recovery. Since “strict product liability” in Massachusetts is 
limited to breach of warranty, and since a breach of warranty actually 
requires a warranty to be breached, Massachusetts plaintiffs—unlike 
plaintiffs in other jurisdictions—do not have a “strict liability” claim 
unless there was a sale or lease that gave rise to a warranty. This 
article argues that this gap should be closed and that there should be a 
remedy under Massachusetts law for a plaintiff who was injured by a 
defective product put into the stream of commerce by a manufacturer, 
even if there was no sale or lease and even if the manufacturer was not 
negligent.6 
To illustrate this difficulty, consider the following hypothetical: 
You get an unsolicited, free sample of a product in the mail. You try 
the product and are injured by it because it was defectively 
manufactured. Assume too that the manufacturer was not negligent in 
producing the product. Do you have a viable case? In most 
jurisdictions you do; in Massachusetts, you probably do not.7 
Second, the amendments to the Massachusetts Uniform 
Commercial Code included the introduction of a second statute of 
limitations into Article 2 of the Code. This has caused problems of 
statutory interpretation, which could have been avoided if strict tort 
liability had been adopted. This article discusses some of these 
problems of interpretation. Because a product liability claim for breach 
of warranty is also actionable under chapter 93A, the Massachusetts 
Consumer Protection Act,8 this article also argues that the four-year 
statute of limitations applicable to chapter 93A claims9 should be 
amended to make it consistent with the three-year limitation period 
applicable to negligence and tort-warranty claims.10 
                                                          
6 See infra Part III.A. 
7 See infra Part III.A. 
8 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A (2010). 
9 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 5A (2010). 
10 See infra Part III.B. 
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Consider two cases. In the first, you are physically injured by a 
defective product that you bought from a retailer, and you want to sue 
the retailer—your direct seller—for breach of warranty. In the second, 
you suffer economic damage caused by a non-conforming product that 
you bought, and you want to sue the manufacturer—a remote seller—
for breach of warranty as a non-privity warranty beneficiary. How 
much time do you have to bring suit in these cases? The normal 
limitation period under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code is 
four years.11 Massachusetts has enacted a non-uniform section that 
abolishes lack of privity as a defense in many warranty actions,12 but 
has imposed a three-year limitation on actions brought under that 
section.13 The point at which the cause of action accrues differs under 
the two sections. The court has generally held that the second section 
with its three-year limitation applies to tort-based warranty claims.14 
Returning to our examples, in the first case, we have a tort-based 
claim for personal injury, but the claim is being brought by a buyer 
who was in privity with the defendant and thus is not, strictly 
speaking, being brought under section 2-318. Do you have four years? 
In the second case, we have a contract-based warranty being brought 
by a non-privity warranty beneficiary. The latter case is being brought 
under section 2-318. Must it be brought within three years? 
Third, the Uniform Commercial Code requires that a buyer give 
notice to the seller of a claimed breach of warranty as a condition of 
any remedy. Because Massachusetts product liability law is based 
exclusively on warranty law, plaintiffs in Massachusetts who wish to 
bring a product liability claim are faced with a contract-based 
requirement from which plaintiffs in other jurisdictions are free. While 
the legislature mitigated the notice requirement in the amendments to 
the Uniform Commercial Code, the notice requirement is nonetheless 
still there. In fact, by including a provision about the notice 
requirement in the amendment that abolished lack of privity as a 
defense, the legislature may actually have imposed a new notice 
requirement on non-privity warranty beneficiaries, persons who did 
not buy the product. Some courts, without specifically considering the 
issue, have interpreted the statute as requiring notice in such cases. 
                                                          
11 See infra note 33. 
12 The lack of privity defense was abolished in many cases, but not all. See infra 
note 50. 
13 See infra note 35. 
14 See infra note 61. 
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This article argues that this interpretation of the statute is wrong. There 
are cases, however, in which there is a clear statutory requirement that 
the buyer give notice to the seller or be barred from any remedy, even 
when the buyer has suffered personal injury. There is no such 
requirement under the law of strict tort liability, and this article argues 
that the notice requirement should be abolished in all cases in which a 
plaintiff is bringing a warranty claim for personal injury.15Consider the 
another hypothetical. You are injured by a product given to you as a 
present; the product was manufactured defectively, but not negligently. 
Do you have to worry about giving notice to the manufacturer as a 
condition of recovering? Elsewhere, the answer is no. The abolition of 
any notice requirement was one of the selling points of strict tort 
liability.16 In Massachusetts, however, you may very well have to 
worry about giving notice.17 
These problems stem from the history and development of 
Massachusetts product liability law, specifically from the failure of 
Massachusetts to adopt a pure tort theory of recovery, independent of 
warranty law. This article addresses these problems. 
II. THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSES 
A. The Problem 
On October 15, 1962, Anna F. Necktas bought a new 1963 Pontiac 
sports coupe, manufactured by General Motors, from Columbia 
Pontiac Co.18 A couple of weeks later, her son Edward was driving the 
car on Route 1 in Dedham.19 The car crossed the median strip and 
struck another vehicle coming from the opposite direction, killing 
Edward.20 There was evidence that the car’s power steering unit was 
defective.21 
Mrs. Necktas, individually and as administratrix of her son’s 
estate, brought several claims against GM and the car dealership.22 
                                                          
15 See infra Part III.C. 
16 See, e.g., Anderson v. Heron Eng’g Co., 604 P.2d 674, 678 (Colo.1979). 
17 See infra Part III.C. 
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Two of her claims—the ones relevant to this article—were for breach 
of warranty, one against GM for the damage done to her car, the other 
against the dealer for wrongful death.23 The first claim failed because 
she was not in privity of contract with the manufacturer;24 the second 
claim failed because “[t]he death statute provides no right of recovery 
for a death resulting from a contractual breach of warranty alone.”25 
B. The Legislative Response: How the Legislature Addressed 
the Problem and in the Process Unnecessarily Complicated 
Massachusetts Product Liability Law. 
The legislature responded to this state of affairs with various 
statutory amendments,26 primarily to the UCC.27 
1. Disclaimers 
First, the legislature prohibited warranty disclaimers in consumer 
sales.28 A non-uniform section, section 2-316A, was added to the 
Code: 
                                                          
23 Id. She also brought (unsuccessful) negligence claims against both defendants 
and a warranty claim against the dealer for which she did recover. Id. at 235–36. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 236. As of 1971, recovery for wrongful death was limited to death caused 
by the negligence or willful, wanton, or reckless act of the defendant. MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (as amended through Act Sept. 22, 1971, ch. 801, sec. 1, 
1971 Mass. Acts 685). At the time, the cause of action was considered an 
exclusively statutory right. The court has since held that “the right to recovery 
for wrongful death is of common law origin,” not a right created by statute. 
Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1972). 
26 The wrongful death statute was also amended to impose liability on “[a] person 
who . . . (5) is responsible for a breach of warranty arising under Article 2 of 
chapter one hundred and six which results in injury to a person that causes 
death . . . .” An Act Further Regulating the Amount of Damages Recoverable in 
Actions for Death, ch. 699, sec. 1, 1973 Mass. Acts 688, 688-89 (1973). These 
amendments will sometimes be referred to collectively as the “product liability 
amendments.” 
27 “The Uniform Commercial Code—as if there is a soul reading this who 
wouldn’t know that, but then again, the Bluebook is the Bluebook.” Marianne M. 
Jennings, I Want to Know What Bearer Paper Is and I Want to Meet a Holder in 
Due Course: Reflections on Instruction in UCC Articles Three and Four, 1992 
BYU L. Rev. 385, 385 n.2. 
28 A valid warranty disclaimer does not preclude a warranty action against the 
seller by a non-party to the agreement who suffers personal injury. Ferragamo v. 
MBTA, 481 N.E.2d 477, 482–83 (Mass. 1985) (holding that a disclaimer of 
warranties was not binding on a buyer’s employee); cf. Theos & Sons, Inc. v. 
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The provisions of section 2-316 [governing warranty disclaimers] 
shall not apply to sales of consumer goods, services or both. Any 
language, oral or written, used by a seller or manufacturer of 
consumer goods and services, which attempts to exclude or modify 
any implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose or to exclude or modify the consumer’s 
remedies for breach of those warranties, shall be unenforceable. 
Any language, oral or written, used by a manufacturer of consumer 
goods, which attempts to limit or modify a consumer’s remedies 
for breach of such manufacturer’s express warranties, shall be 
unenforceable, unless such manufacturer maintains facilities within 
the commonwealth sufficient to provide reasonable and 
expeditious performance of the warranty obligations.29 
Three years later, the section was amended to provide that “[t]he 
provisions of this section may not be disclaimed or waived by 
agreement.” 30 The section was again amended in 1996, and now states 
in relevant part: 
(1) The provisions of section 2-316 shall not apply to the extent 
provided in this section. 
(2) Any language, oral or written, used by a seller or manufacturer 
of consumer goods and services, which attempts to exclude or 
modify any implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
                                                                                                                                         
Mack Trucks, Inc., 729 N.E.2d 1113, 1117–18 (Mass. 2000) (holding that a 
disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability was enforceable against a 
subsequent corporate purchaser). 
29 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A, added by An Act Providing That Any 
Attempt to Exclude or Modify the Warranty of Merchantability or Fitness for a 
Particular Purpose in a Sale of Consumer Goods Shall be Unenforceable, ch. 
880, 1970 Mass. Acts 809. Further citations to the UCC will be to the Code as 
enacted in Massachusetts. The official text of the Code, where different from the 
Massachusetts version, will be cited as “UCC § _.” In 2003, an amended Article 
2 was promulgated, but it has not been enacted in any state and, according to the 
conventional wisdom, will not be. See generally William H. Henning, Amended 
Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 131 (2009) (providing a brief 
explanation of the rise and fall of the amended article). In 2011, the 2003 
amendments were withdrawn from the official text of the Code. See Current 
Projects, AM. LAW INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj
_ip&projectid=4 (last visited Sept. 16, 2012). The definition of “consumer 
goods” in MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 9-102(23), “goods that are used or 
bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,” applies to 
Article 2. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-103(3). 
30 An Act Further Regulating the Limitation, Exclusion or Waiver of Warranties in 
the Sale of Consumer Goods and Services, ch. 799, sec. 1, 1973 Mass. Acts 785 
(codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A). 
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particular purpose or to exclude or modify the consumer’s 
remedies for breach of those warranties, shall be unenforceable. 
. . . . 
(4) Any language, oral or written, used by a seller or manufacturer 
of goods and services, which attempts to exclude or modify any 
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular 
purpose or to exclude or modify remedies for breach of those 
warranties, shall be unenforceable with respect to injury to the 
person. This subsection does not affect the validity under other law 
of an agreement between a seller or manufacturer of goods and 
services and a buyer that is an organization (see Section 1-
201(28)), allocating, as between them, the risk of damages from or 
providing indemnity for breaches of those warranties with respect 
to injury to the person. 
(5) The provisions of this section may not be disclaimed or waived 
by agreement.31 
2. The Statute of Limitations 
The second change to the law was that the statute of limitations for 
the relevant warranty claims was conformed to the general tort 
limitation period.32 The normal limitation period for breach of contract 
actions under Article 2 is four years after the cause of action accrues.33 
In the case of a breach of warranty, the cause of action ordinarily 
accrues on tender of delivery, regardless of the aggrieved party’s 
knowledge.34 Product liability cases, however, were made subject to a 
three-year limitation period, which begins to run when the injury and 
damage occur.35 
                                                          
31 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A (2010) (as amended by An Act Further 
Amending the Uniform Commercial Code Relative to Personal Property 
Leasing, ch. 377, sec. 5, 1996 Mass. Acts 1437, 1471). 
32 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 2A (2010). 
33 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-725(1) (2010). 
34 Id. at § 2-725(2). 
35 Id. at § 2-318 (“All actions under this section shall be commenced within three 
years next after the date the injury [and damages] occurs.”). The original 
limitations period was two years from “the date the injury occurs.” Act of Sept. 
7, 1973, ch. 750, sec. 1, 1973 Mass. Acts 739, 740. The words “and damages” 
were added as part of the 1974 amendment. Act of April 25, 1974, ch. 153, 1973 
Mass. Acts 80, 81. The effect of these amendments was to make the section 2-
318 statute of limitation parallel the tort statutes of limitation. See MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 260, §§ 2A & 4. See e.g., Bay State-Spray & Provincetown S.S., Inc. 
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 533 N.E.2d 1350, 1352–54 (Mass. 1989) (holding that 
the statute of limitations of section 2-318 applies to tort-based warranty claims). 
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3. Privity 
The third and most significant change involved the privity 
requirement. Lack of privity—the relationship between parties to a 
contract—was traditionally a bar to warranty claims.36 Courts and 
commentators recognize different types of privity. “Vertical” privity 
refers to the relationship of the parties in the chain of distribution.37 It 
becomes an issue when a buyer attempts to sue a remote seller. 
“Horizontal” privity38 refers to the relationship between the seller 
(typically a retailer) and a non-buyer who has used or been affected by 
the goods.39 Privity was required under the Sales Act in order to 
maintain a warranty claim.40 The Code changed things. 
The original official text of UCC section 2-318 was enacted in 
Massachusetts: 
A seller’s warranty whether express or implied extends to any 
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or 
who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such 
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is 
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not 
exclude or limit the operation of this section.41 
This section expanded the number of potential plaintiffs by 
eliminating the defense of horizontal privity in warranty claims by a 
limited number of natural persons (human beings, as opposed to other 
legal persons) who have suffered personal injury, not economic loss or 
                                                                                                                                         
The discovery rule applies to the section 2-318 statute of limitations. Lareau v. 
Page, 39 F.3d 384, 388–89 (1st Cir. 1994). Whether the section 2-318 limitation 
period, by its terms, applies to all warranty claims for personal injury is 
discussed in Part III.C. 
36 Historically, lack of privity was a bar to negligence claims as well. That rule was 
abolished in Massachusetts by Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 695–96 
(Mass. 1946). 
37 E.g., Dalton v. Stanley Solar & Stove, Inc., 629 A.2d 794, 796 (N.H. 1993) 
(“Vertical privity exists, for example, between a wholesaler and retailer, and 
between a retailer and the ultimate buyer . . . .”). 
38 Id. (“[Horizontal privity] denotes the relationship between the retailer and one 
who uses or consumes the goods.”). 
39 Some commentators use the expression “diagonal privity” to cover the case 
where both vertical and horizontal privity are lacking. See WILLIAM D. 
HAWKLAND & LINDA J. RUSCH, 1 HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 2-318:1 (West 
2012). 
40 E.g., Pearl v. William Filene’s Sons Co., 58 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Mass. 1945). 
41 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (1966) (prior to 1971 amendment). 
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property damage.42 The provision did not, however, do away with the 
problem of vertical privity by expanding the pool of potential 
defendants to include remote sellers. The beneficiaries of the seller’s 
warranty are limited to those in the family or household of “his” 
buyer.43 
In 1966, the official text of the UCC was amended by the addition 
of two alternative versions of section 2-318, which variously expand 
the number of beneficiaries of the seller’s warranty.44 In a series of 
amendments, starting in 1971, the legislature rewrote the section, 
completely abolishing lack of privity as a defense.45 Section 2-318 
now reads: 
                                                          
42 “‘Person’ includes an individual or an organization.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, 
§ 1-201(30) (2010). “‘Organization’ includes a corporation, government or 
governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or 
association, two or more persons having a joint or common interest, or any other 
legal or commercial entity.” Id. § 1-201(28). 
43 See supra text accompanying note 41. 
44 The original version of U.C.C. section 2-318 is now Alternative A. 
 U.C.C. section 2-318, Alternative B expands the number of warranty 
beneficiaries, but is limited to personal injury claims. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1966) (“A 
seller’s warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who 
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and 
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or 
limit the operation of this section.”). 
 U.C.C. section 2-318, Alternative C enlarges the pool of potential plaintiffs by 
admitting non-natural persons and removes the limitation on the type of harm 
covered. Id. (“A seller’s warranty whether express or implied extends to any 
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the 
goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or 
limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an 
individual to whom the warranty extends.”); see generally Jacobs v. Yamaha 
Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758, 762–63 (Mass. 1995) (discussing 
alternative C) 
45 In 1973 the legislature inserted the word “lessor” in the first and second 
sentences and added the third and fourth sentences. An Act Providing That Lack 
of Privity of Contract Shall Not Be a Defense in Actions for Breach of Warranty 
of Negligence Brought Against a Lessor of Goods and Establishing a Statute of 
Limitations for the Commencement of Such Action, ch. 750, sec. 1, 1973 Mass. 
Acts 739, 739–40 (amending MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318). In 1974 the 
legislature amended the statute further by extending the limitation period from 
two to three years and added the words “and damage” in the last sentence. An 
Act Extending the Time Within Which Actions For Breach of Warranty May Be 
Brought, ch. 153, 1974 Mass. Acts 80, 81 (amending MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, 
§ 2-318). 
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Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense 
in any action brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or 
supplier of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty, 
express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not 
purchase the goods from the defendant if the plaintiff was a person 
whom the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier might reasonably 
have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods. The 
manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier may not exclude or limit the 
operation of this section. Failure to give notice shall not bar 
recovery under this section unless the defendant proves that he was 
prejudiced thereby. All actions under this section shall be 
commenced within three years next after the date the injury and 
damage occurs.46 
The 1973 amendment made section 2-318 applicable to lessors.47 
In 1996, Massachusetts adopted Article 2A of the UCC, which governs 
leases of personal property.48 Article 2A generally parallels Article 2, 
except for changes in terminology reflecting the different subject 
matter of the two articles. The non-uniform Massachusetts versions of 
section 2-316A49 and section 2-318 have been replicated in section 
2A-214A50 and section 2A-216.51 Although there are no substantive 
                                                          
46 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (2010). 
47 Id. 
48 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, Art. 2A added by An Act Further Amending the 
Uniform Commercial Code Relative to Personal Property Leasing, ch. 377, sec. 
2, 1996 Mass. Acts 1437. 
49 Section 2-316A was amended as part of the same act that adopted Article 2A. 
An Act Further Amending the Uniform Commercial Code Relative to Personal 
Property Leashing, ch. 377, sec. 5, 1996 Mass. Acts 1437, 1471–72 (enacted as 
amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A (2010)). 
50 Section 2A-214A states: 
(1) The provisions of section 2A-214 [which governs warranty 
disclaimers] shall not apply to the extent provided in this section. 
(2) Any language, oral or written, in a consumer lease, which 
attempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or 
modify the lessee’s remedies for breach of those warranties, shall 
be unenforceable. 
. . . . 
(4) Any language, oral or written, in a lease which attempts to 
exclude or modify any implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or modify remedies 
for breach of those warranties, shall be unenforceable with respect 
to injury to the person. This subsection does not affect the validity 
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differences between the parallel sections, as a technical matter, product 
liability claims against lessors should now be regarded as falling under 
Article 2A. 
“The result [of these amendments] is to provide a remedy as 
comprehensive as that provided by § 402A of the Restatement, a 
remedy not limited by the ‘Caveat’ appended to § 402A.”52 Or, as 
another court put it, “Massachusetts codified the Restatement’s 
definition of strict liability at section 2-318 of the U.C.C. and called it 
‘breach of warranty.’”53 
                                                                                                                                         
under other law of an agreement between a lessor or supplier and a 
lessee that is an organization (see Section 1-201(28)), allocating, as 
between them, the risk of damages from or providing indemnity 
for breaches of those warranties with respect to injury to the 
person. 
(5) The provisions of this section may not be disclaimed or waived 
by agreement. 
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2A-214A (2010). 
51 Section 2A-216 states: 
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense 
in any action brought against the manufacturer, supplier or lessor 
of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty, express or 
implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not rent or 
lease the goods from the defendant if the plaintiff was a person 
whom the manufacturer, supplier or lessor might reasonably have 
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods. The 
manufacturer, supplier or lessor may not exclude or limit the 
operation of this section. Failure to give notice shall not bar 
recovery under this section unless the defendant proves that he was 
prejudiced thereby. All actions under this section shall be 
commenced within three years next after the date the injury and 
damage occurs. 
 Id. § 2A-216. 
52 Swartz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Mass. 1978) (internal citation 
omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Caveat (1965) 
(“The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rules stated in this Section 
may not apply (1) to harm to persons other than users or consumers; (2) to the 
seller of a product expected to be processed or otherwise substantially changed 
before it reaches the user or consumer; or (3) to the seller of a component part of 
a product to be assembled.”). 
53 Hadar v. Concordia Yacht Builders, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1082, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995). The court’s statement is generally true, but the devil, as usual, is in the 
details, and there are a couple of devils that have yet to be exorcised from 
Massachusetts warranty law. If the statement were completely accurate, you 
would not be reading this article. 
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Perhaps the most significant result, at least from a theoretical point 
of view, is that the current state of Massachusetts warranty law 
confirms the truth of Prosser’s famous description of warranty: “a 
freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract.”54 
Massachusetts may be trying to get too much mileage out of this 
particular hybrid. 
C. The Judicial Response: How the Court Imposed Some 
Order on the Chaos 
The product liability amendments remedied some of the 
deficiencies of Massachusetts warranty law. They created some 
additional problems, however, both by what they did and by what they 
did not do. It was left to the court to address these problems to the 
extent that the court felt that the legislature had left it any leeway to do 
so. 
The amendments to section 2-318, in particular, muddied the 
waters. It was unclear from the language of the statute whether or to 
what extent the amendments applied to warranty claims other than 
“strict tort” claims, i.e. to “commercial” or contract-based warranty 
claims where the claimed loss is purely economic.55 
“Through the early 1980’s, Massachusetts courts assumed that the 
privity requirement had been abolished [by the 1971 amendments to 
section 2-318] for all breach of warranty causes of action regardless of 
the type of injury claimed by the plaintiff.”56 A series of cases since 
                                                          
54 William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1125 (1960). 
55 John C. Bartenstein, Recent Developments in Commercial Warranty Law: Bay 
State and Canal Electric, BOS. B.J., May–June 1991, at 4, 5. 
56 Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 70, 98 (D. Mass. 1998); see, 
e.g., Burnham v. Mark IV Homes, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Mass. 1982); 
Cameo Curtains, Inc. v. Philip Carey Corp., 416 N.E.2d 995, 998 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1981). The plaintiffs in the Burnham case were the buyers of modular homes 
who sued the manufacturer. Burnham, 441 N.E.2d at 1029. The court, without 
any discussion of the issue, merely stated that “[l]ack of privity between Mark 
IV, a manufacturer, and the plaintiffs, is no longer a defense.” Id. at 1031 
(citing. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318). In Cameo Curtains, a (corporate) 
buyer sued the manufacturer of allegedly defective roofing materials. Cameo 
Curtains, Inc.,416 N.E.2d at 996–97. The court, again without discussion of the 
issue, applied the statute of limitation, notice, and privity provisions of section 
2-318 to the claim. Id. at 997–98; cf. Marcil v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 
403 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (“The plaintiff [buyer of a loader] 
does not benefit from the enactment of St. 1971, c. 670, § 1, which amended 
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then has clarified many of the issues involving the applicability vel 
non of the product liability amendments to all warranty claims. 
In Wilson v. Hammer Holdings, Inc., the plaintiffs sought recovery 
when a painting that they had purchased twenty-six years earlier 
turned out to be a fake.57 The issue in the case58 was whether the 
applicable statute of limitation was section 2-725 (four years from 
tender of delivery) or section 2-318 (three years after the injury and 
damage occur).59 The First Circuit held that section 2-318 did not 
apply because that section “is designed to cover breach of warranty 
actions that are in essence products liability actions, and is not 
designed as an alternative for contractually based warranty claims.”60 
The court did not decide in what circumstances section 2-318 would 
apply.61 
The approach taken by the First Circuit in Wilson was validated a 
year later by the Supreme Judicial Court in Bay State-Spray & 
Provincetown S.S., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,62 the first of the 
two leading cases construing section 2-318. In 1972 the plaintiff 
ordered its eponymous steamship “Provincetown” to be built by a 
                                                                                                                                         
G.L. c. 106, § 2-318, and eliminated the defense of privity to an action for 
breach of warranty, because he purchased the loader before the effective date of 
the statute.”); see also Bartenstein, supra note 55, at 5–6. 
57 Wilson v. Hammer Holdings, Inc., 850 F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir. 1988). 
58 See supra notes 32 & 35. 
59 Wilson, 850 F.2d at 4. 
60 Id. at 7–8. 
61 The First Circuit stated: 
 In particular, we need not consider whether section 2-318 is 
applicable when a plaintiff seeks breach of warranty damages only 
for economic loss and not for physical injuries. We note, however, 
that the Comment in connection with the 1973 amendment of 
section 2-318 suggests that that section should have a three-year 
statute of limitation so that it would be consistent with the period 
for tort actions and actions of contracts to recover for personal 
injuries. We view this as an indication that at least the primary 
purpose of section 2-318 is to govern actions involving personal 
injuries, which is the dominant aspect of products liability cases. 
 Id. at 8 n.7. In point of fact, section 2-318’s statute of limitation ought not to 
have been applied in Wilson because the parties were in privity, and the 
plaintiffs’ action was not “under this section.” See infra Part III.B. 
62 Bay State-Spray & Provincetown S.S., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 533 
N.E.2d 1350 (Mass. 1989). 
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shipyard.63 The defendant manufactured the ship’s engines.64 The ship 
was put in service in 1973 in the plaintiff’s passenger ferry service 
between Boston and Provincetown.65 On August 17, 1980, the ship’s 
engine malfunctioned, disrupting its operating schedule and 
necessitating repairs.66 The plaintiff brought suit in May 1982, to 
recover damages for the cost of repair and for lost profits caused by 
the engine’s malfunction.67 The main issue in the case,68 as in Wilson, 
was the applicable statute of limitation:69 section 2-318 (three years 
after the injury and damage occurred on August 17, 1980) or section 2-
725 (four years after the tender of delivery in 1973). 
After reviewing the history and purposes of the product liability 
amendments to “determin[e] what the Legislature intended to achieve 
by amendments to section 2-318,” the court “conclude[d] that the 
statute of limitation of section 2-318 applies to tort-based warranty 
claims and that the statute of limitation of section 2-725 applies to 
contract-based warranty claims.”70 The focus of the analysis is on the 
“nature” or “substance” of the warranty claim.71 A claim to recover 
                                                          





68 The defendant also argued that the plaintiff’s claim was a tort-based admiralty 
claim and, as such, was not viable because the plaintiff had suffered only 
economic loss. The court rejected this argument because the plaintiff’s claim 
was “a contract-based claim of breach of warranty and is outside admiralty 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 1351–52. 
69 Privity or the lack thereof was not the issue in the case: 
 Caterpillar does not argue that, even if its claim were asserted 
seasonably, as a remote purchaser (i.e., as one not in vertical 
privity), Steamship would not be entitled to recover on a timely 
asserted contract-based warranty claim. A plaintiff not in vertical 
privity is a buyer in the distributive chain who did not buy directly 
from the defendant. In comparison, a plaintiff not in horizontal 
privity is one who did not buy the goods within the distributive 
chain but consumes, uses, or is affected by them, such as a member 
of the buyer’s family. 
 Id. at 1353 n.4 (citation omitted). 
70 Id. at 1353. 
71 Id. at 1355. 
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economic loss is contract-based and not actionable in negligence or 
tort-based strict liability.72 
Although Bay State-Spray specifically addressed which statute of 
limitations applied to contract-based warranty claims, courts and 
commentators have applied the analytical approach of the decision to 
other issues raised by the product liability amendments.73 
In Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., the other leading case 
on the reach of section 2-318, the plaintiff bought a Yamaha 
motorcycle from a dealer.74 It turned out to be a lemon.75 He brought it 
in to the dealer fifteen times in his first year of ownership.76 When he 
took the motorcycle in for the fifteenth time and learned that the 
engine was being rebuilt, he told the dealer and subsequently the 
manufacturer that he wanted his money back.77 When he didn’t get it 
back, he sued the dealer (who went out of business) and then the 
manufacturer on several theories, including breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability.78 The case thus involved a contract-based 
                                                          
72 Id. at 1353. The Supreme Judicial Court specifically approved the decision of 
the Appeals Court in Marcil v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 403 N.E.2d 430, 
434 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (holding buyer may not maintain a claim for 
negligent design or manufacture where the only damages claimed were 
economic loss or damage caused by the product to itself). 
73 See Bartenstein, supra note 55, at 6; see also Hadar v. Concordia Yacht 
Builders, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1082, 1097–98 (S.D. N.Y. 1995) (finding section 2-
318 applies to tort-based warranty actions and that privity is necessary in 
contract-based warranty claim); Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 
70, 99 (D. Mass. 1998) (finding privity necessary in commercial warranty case); 
Irish Venture, Inc. v. Fleetguard, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87 (D. Mass. 2003) 
(“[P]rivity of contract is required in implied warranty claims regarding 
commercial transactions.”); Cruickshank v. Clean Seas Co., 346 B.R. 571, 581–
82 (D. Mass. 2006) (“[P]laintiffs have failed to establish that they were in 
privity with Clean Seas . . . . Therefore, [the counts] alleging breach of express 
and implied warranties should be dismissed.”); First Choice Armor & Equip., 
Inc. v. Toyobo America, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 407, 413 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(dismissing plaintiff’s warranty claim as a matter of law because plaintiff could 
not establish privity). 
74 Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758, 759 (Mass. 1995). 
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warranty claim by a consumer buyer of a consumer good against a 
remote seller for economic loss.79 
The manufacturer argued that the warranty was given only by the 
actual seller, “the defunct dealer from which the plaintiff purchased 
the motorcycle.”80 The court rejected the argument based on the 
language of two of the amended sections.81 
First, section 2-316A “denies enforcement of exclusions or 
limitation of any implied warranty of merchantability attempted ‘by a 
seller or manufacturer of consumer goods[.]’ The implication of that 
language is that a manufacturer of consumer goods makes an implied 
warranty of merchantability to the consumer.”82 
Second, and more important, the court construed section 2-318 to 
allow the buyer of consumer goods to bring a contract-based warranty 
claim directly against a manufacturer.83 
The fact that § 2-318 was enacted with a focus on remedies for 
personal injuries caused by a breach of warranty . . . should not 
inhibit the independent development of the law concerning 
warranties extended to the buyer of defective goods. Contract-
based warranty claims involving commercial transactions may 
generally call for different treatment than tort-based warranty 
claims. . . . However, contract-based warranty claims of buyers of 
consumer goods themselves deserve separate consideration 
because of special legislation affecting them. We respond to this 
special legislative treatment by implementing the purposes of § 2-
316A and § 2-318 and recognizing the right of a buyer of 
consumer goods to sue the manufacturer directly for a breach of an 
implied warranty of merchantability. We conclude that a buyer of 
consumer goods has the right to maintain an action for breach of 
the implied warranty of merchantability against the manufacturer 
of that product.84 
Jacobs came as a bit of a surprise to those who thought that Bay 
State-Spray had definitively confined section 2-318 to tort-based 
warranties. The Jacobs court did, however, strongly hint that its 
                                                          
79 The motorcycle qualified as a consumer good within the meaning of the statute. 
See supra note 29. The manufacturer’s attempt to disclaim implied warranties 
was therefore ineffective under section 2-316A. Jacobs, 649 N.E.2d at 761 




84 Id. at 763 (citations omitted). 
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holding was limited to consumer contracts, and there are several post-
Jacobs decisions in the federal courts holding that privity is required to 
maintain a commercial contract-based warranty claim.85 
D. Summary: The Dust Settles 
Many of the uncertainties created by the product liability 
amendments have been resolved. Two categories of warranty claims 
have been distinguished. Tort-based claims for personal injury or 
property damage,86 and contract-based claims for economic loss or 
damage caused by the product to itself.87 The second category is 
divided further into consumer claims and commercial claims.88 
Lack of privity is not a defense to tort-based warranty claims. 
When brought by non-privity beneficiaries, such claims accrue when 
the injury or damage occurs and are subject to the three-year statute of 
limitation.89 Disclaimers are ineffective with respect to consumer 
goods and with respect to other goods if personal injury results.90 
Remedy limitations for breach are also unenforceable.91 
Lack of privity is likewise not a defense to a contract-based 
warranty claim for economic loss in the case of consumer goods.92 
Disclaimers of the implied warranties and remedy limitations are 
                                                          
85 See cases cited supra note 73. 
86 That is to say damage to property other than the product at issue. Damage to the 
product itself is considered a type of “economic loss.” E.g., Marcil v. John 
Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 403 N.E.2d 430, 434 & n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). 
Damage to property other than the product itself brings the case under the three-
year limitation period of section 2-318. Fine v. Huygens, DiMella, Shaffer & 
Assocs., 783 N.E.2d 842, 845–46 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
87 Jacobs, 649 N.E.2d at 763. 
88 Id. 
89 See supra text accompanying note 44. 
90 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, §§ 2-316A(2), (4) (2010); see supra Part II.B. 
91 Id. § 2-316A(2), (4). As a general rule, Article 2 contract remedies may be 
limited by agreement under section 2-719, but “[l]imitation of consequential 
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie 
unconscionable. . . .” Id. § 2-719(3). The specific language of section 2-316A(2) 
and (4) making such limitations “unenforceable” should preclude any attempt to 
rebut the presumption of unconscionability under the language of section 2-
719(3). 
92 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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prohibited.93 The applicable statute of limitations is probably four 
years.94 
Privity is required in commercial warranty cases, and the normal 
rules relating to disclaimers and remedy limitations apply. 
III. HOW THE LEGISLATURE AND THE COURT STUNTED THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 
One result of the product liability amendments is that the court has 
declined to recognize strict tort liability in the product area as part of 
Massachusetts law.95 “Declined,” actually, is a bit of an 
understatement. The court has construed the amendments as 
preempting the field of liability without fault for defective products, 
thus prohibiting the recognition of strict tort liability or the extension 
of warranty liability to transactions other than sales or leases.96 
                                                          
93 Jacobs, 649 N.E.2d at 761. 
94 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
95 E.g., Swartz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Mass. 1978); 
Commonwealth v. Johnson Insulation, 682 N.E.2d 1323, 1326 (Mass. 1997) 
(“We have declined to allow claims for strict liability in tort for defective 
products, but we have recognized that, by eliminating most contractually-based 
defenses to the implied warranty of merchantability (such as the requirements of 
privity and of notice), the Legislature has imposed duties on merchants as a 
matter of social policy, and has expressed its intent that this warranty should 
establish liability as comprehensive as that to be found in other jurisdictions that 
have adopted the tort of strict product liability.”); Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor 
Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758, 763 n.6 (Mass. 1995) (“We were led to this 
approach, probably unavoidably, by the Legislature’s expansive amendments of 
§ 2-318. St. 1971, c. 670, § 1; St. 1973, c. 750, § 1; St. 1974, c. 153”). See also 
Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968–69 (Mass. 1978); Mason v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 490 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1986). 
 Sometimes plaintiffs bring a product claim labeled as a strict liability claim. The 
courts will ordinarily either treat such claims as warranty claims or dismiss them 
when the plaintiff has also brought a warranty claim. E.g., Smith v. Robertshaw 
Controls Co., 410 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2005) (treating a strict products liability 
claims as a breach of warranty claim); Cruickshank v. Clean Seas Co., 346 B.R. 
571, 577–78 (D. Mass. 2006) (dismissing a strict liability count where plaintiffs 
asserted separate claims for breach of warranty.); Public Serv. Mut. Ins. v. 
Empire Comfort Syss., Inc., 573 F. Supp. 2d 372, 380–81 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(holding that a strict liability claim fails as matter of law). 
96 Mason, 490 N.E.2d at 442; cf. Soule v. Mass. Elec. Co., 390 N.E.2d 716, 719 
(Mass. 1979) (holding that the enactment of a statute codifying “attractive 
nuisance” doctrine twenty three years after plaintiff injured does not foreclose 
 
2013 Benevolent Maleficence 35 
The Legislature has jettisoned many of the doctrinal encumbrances 
of the law of sales, and what remains is a very different theory of 
recovery from that traditionally associated with the sale of goods. 
The Legislature has made the Massachusetts law of warranty 
congruent in nearly all respects with the principles expressed in 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).97 
“Thus, a claim for breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability should be considered in light of the requirements for 
warranties contained in [M.]G.L. c. 106, §§ 2-314 to 2-318, as well as 
the principles expressed in § 402A of the Restatement.”98 
This article explores some of the remaining “doctrinal 
encumbrances of the law of sales”99 that make Massachusetts law 
incongruent with general principles of product liability law elsewhere 
or that create unnecessary problems of statutory interpretation. The 
“encumbrances” considered are the restriction of strict liability to sales 
and leases and the notice requirement. The problems of statutory 
interpretation considered are those caused by the introduction into 
Article 2 of two statutes of limitations100 and two notice provisions101 
by the product liability amendments. This article will make a few 
suggestions about what the Courts—of both the General and the 
Supreme Judicial variety—should do about the situation. This article 
argues that, by either judicial or legislative action, “strict product 
liability” in Massachusetts should not be restricted to cases arising out 
of sales or leases, but that there should be a remedy under 
Massachusetts law for a plaintiff who was injured by a defective 
product put into the stream of commerce by a manufacturer even if 
there was no sale or lease and even if the manufacturer was not 
negligent. 
After discussing some of the problems of statutory interpretation 
caused by having two statutes of limitation applicable to warranty 
                                                                                                                                         
court from recognizing common-law duty of reasonable care by a landowner to 
prevent harm to foreseeable child trespassers). 
97 Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 969 (Mass. 1978). 
98 Commonwealth v. Johnson Insulation, 682 N.E.2d 1323, 1326–27 (Mass. 1997) 
(internal citations omitted). In a footnote, the court noted that the American Law 
Institute had recently approved “a new formulation of the law of product 
liability” in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, but did not 
consider its applicability to the case. Id. at 1327 n.6. 
99 Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969. 
100 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, §§ 2-318, 2-725 (2010). 
101 Id. §§ 2-318, 2-607(3)(a). 
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claims, this article suggests that the four-year statute of limitations 
applicable to chapter 93A claims should be amended to make it 
consistent with the three-year limitation period applicable to 
negligence and tort-warranty claims. 
Finally, this article argues that the notice provision of section 2-
318 should not be construed to impose a notice requirement on non-
privity warranty beneficiaries and that, in any event, the notice 
requirement should be abolished in all cases in which a plaintiff—
whether in privity with the defendant or not—is bringing a warranty 
claim for personal injury. 
A. The Sales Requirement 
One of the “doctrinal encumbrances of the law of sales” that is still 
part of Massachusetts product liability law is the law of sales itself.102 
If the liability is to be based on breach of warranty, the underlying 
transaction must have given rise to a warranty, the breach of which 
caused the plaintiff’s injury. 
1. The Problem of the Self-Service Case 
The plaintiff in Lasky v. Economy Grocery Stores went into a self-
service store.103 She wanted to buy six bottles of tonic.104 While she 
was taking a bottle from the case, it exploded, severely injuring her.105 
She sued the store for breach of warranty under the Sales Act and lost 
because a contract for sale—with the concomitant warranty 
obligation—had not been formed yet.106 
The precise question at issue in Lasky has not arisen since the case 
was decided.107 Were the SJC confronted with the same issue today,108 
                                                          
102 See Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969. The “sales requirement” includes the “lease 
requirement” for cases arising under Art. 2A. See supra text accompanying 
notes 45–50. 
103 Lasky v. Econ. Grocery Stores, 65 N.E.2d 305, 305 (Mass. 1946). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 See id. at 307. 
107 In Hadley v. Hillcrest Dairy, Inc., 171 N.E.2d 293 (Mass. 1961), a case decided 
under the Sales Act, the plaintiff was injured when a glass milk jug, which the 
defendant had delivered to his house, shattered when he placed it on the table. 
The court held that it was “immaterial whether or not the property in the jug 
passed to the plaintiff . . . a sale of the container, as such, is not necessary in 
order for the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability to attach in this 
transaction.” Id. at 295. 
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it would probably conclude that a “sale” or a “contract for sale”109 had 
taken place to give rise to the implied warranty of merchantability. 
That is generally the result under the UCC.110 A slight variation in the 
standard fact pattern could change that result, however. In McQuiston 
v. K-Mart Corp., a customer injured her wrist when she lifted the lid of 
a cookie jar displayed on a store shelf and the lid came apart.111 She 
had lifted the jar’s lid to see if the price tag was located inside.112 She 
had not formed any intent to purchase.113 She sued the retailer and the 
manufacturer on theories of strict liability and breach of implied 
warranty.114 The circuit court upheld the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment on the implied warranty theory because no sale of 
                                                                                                                                         
 In McKone v Ralph’s Wonder Market, Inc., 27 Mass. App. Dec. 159, 4 UCC 
Rep. Serv. 943 (1963), an action against a market for injuries received from the 
explosion of a glass bottle filled with milk which had been purchased from the 
market, the court stated that the UCC Article 2 implied warranty of 
merchantability provision required a sale of the article involved and that there 
was no evidence of a sale of the bottle. 
 The McKone decision is surely wrong. Under § 2-314(2), “[g]oods to be 
merchantable must be at least . . . adequately contained, packaged, and labeled 
as the agreement may require . . . .” See Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 588 
P.2d 233 (Wash. 1978) (holding that a restaurant was liable for breach of 
warranty of merchantability where a wine glass broke injuring a patron’s hand 
even though the restaurant did not sell the glass itself). 
108 Lasky was cited as recently as 2003 in a larceny case for the proposition that 
customers in self-service stores have conditional possession of the goods that 
they remove from display areas. Commonwealth v. Vickers, 798 N.E.2d 575, 
579 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
109 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-106(1) (2010) (“‘Contract for sale’ includes both 
a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A ‘sale’ 
consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price . . . .”). 
110 See, e.g., Gillispie v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 187 S.E.2d 441, 444 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1972) (holding that a sale consummated and implied warranties arise if the 
seller completes delivery and that no further act of delivery was necessary when 
buyer takes possession of goods with intention of paying for them); see also 
Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 225 S.E.2d 691, 693 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) 
(holding that a contract for sale of goods comes into being when a buyer accepts 
the seller’s offer by taking physical possession of goods with intent to pay for 
them). 
111 McQuiston v. K-Mart Corp., 796 F.2d 1346, 1347 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 
112 Id. at 1348. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 1347. 
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the product had occurred.115 As against the retailer, there can be no 
implied warranty without a sale, and no sale had occurred even under 
the self-service line of cases.116 The plaintiff’s (unsuccessful) strict 
liability claim did go to trial.117 In Massachusetts, the customer would 
not have a claim against the store.118 
Although as a policy matter, there is little reason to distinguish 
between a store’s liability before and after the buyer pays for the 
goods, there clearly is no liability on the part of the buyer to pay 
for the goods and therefore no sale or contract for sale. It is clearly 
an artifice to treat the buyer’s taking an item from the shelf as 
being an agreement to purchase the item subject to a condition 
subsequent. 
States that have adopted the strict tort liability theory have avoided 
the necessity of extending the implied warranty of merchantability 
to cover the situation here considered, by holding that the seller 
who puts a dangerous product on display is liable to those coming 
within the zone of danger without regard to whether there has been 
a sale or not.119 
2. The Problem of Bailments and Goods Not Tendered for 
Delivery 
In Mason v. General Motors Corp., the leading Massachusetts case 
on this issue, the plaintiff’s decedents were killed in an accident while 
test-driving a motor vehicle with the permission of the defendant 
dealership.120 The court upheld summary judgment in favor of the 
dealership on the breach of warranty claim because there was no 
                                                          
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1349. 
118 The customer could bring a negligence claim, but negligence claims against 
retail sellers are ordinarily limited to claims based on a failure to warn of known 
dangers. See Enrich v. Windmere Corp., 616 N.E.2d 1081, 1084 (Mass. 1993) 
(“A seller of a product manufactured by another is not liable in an action for 
negligence unless it knew or had reason to know of the dangerous condition that 
caused the accident.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 (1965) (“A 
seller of a chattel manufactured by a third person, who neither knows nor has 
reason to know that it is, or is likely to be, dangerous, is not liable in an action 
for negligence for harm caused by the dangerous character or condition of the 
chattel because of his failure to discover the danger by an inspection or test of 
the chattel before selling it.”). 
119 3 LARY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE U.C.C. § 2-314:532 cmt. (West 2012). 
120 490 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Mass. 1986). 
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warranty in the transaction.121 “There is no statutory language, 
however, that reasonably may be construed as either creating or 
sanctioning the judicial creation of a warranty in connection with a 
bailment of the kind that occurred in this case.”122 The statements 
made in earlier cases about the congruity of Massachusetts warranty 
law and section 402A were made in cases in which there had been a 
sale.123 
Once a transaction has occurred in which a warranty is implied by 
our statute, as in the cases cited above, the nature of the warranty 
and the parties benefited by it are the same as, or at least very 
similar to, the warranties and beneficiaries recognized in § 402A of 
the Restatement, and the remedies are congruent. However, unlike 
our warranty law, under § 402A an injured plaintiff may recover 
damages resulting from a defective product regardless of whether 
title to the product passed or there was a contract to pass title to the 
product or the product was leased. We did not intend our 
statements to encompass transactions other than contracts of sale 
and leases. In any event, our statements did not insert in the statute 
words that the Legislature had not put there.124 
The court reiterated its refusal to create additional common-law 
warranty remedies or to recognize strict tort liability apart from 
liability for breach of warranty under the Code.125 These are “matters 
of social policy to which the Legislature has given its attention,” and 
the court had “decided [in earlier cases] to defer to the Legislature’s 
judgment in those matters, and, we believe, rightly so.”126 
The court did not use the word “preemption,” but that is, in effect, 
what the court held. By enacting the product liability amendments to 
the UCC, the legislature had not only preempted strict tort liability in 
the area of sales and leases, it had also effectively prohibited the 
development of strict liability in non-sale transactions. Massachusetts 
                                                          
121 Id. at 440 (“[T]he issue is whether, as [the dealer] contends, a sale, or a contract 
to sell, or a lease is necessary in order for a warranty of merchantability to be 
implied under Massachusetts law.”). 
122 See id. at 441. There is, however, language in the official comment to UCC 
section 2-313 that the warranty provisions of Art. 2 are not designed to disturb 
the developing case law that warranties need not be confined to sales contracts. 
See infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
123 Mason v. Gen. Motors Corp., 490 N.E.2d at 441–42. 
124 Id. at 442. 
125 See sources cited supra note 4. 
126 Mason, at 490 N.E.2d at 442. 
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law, as so construed, is thus, if not unique, at least that of an 
infinitesimally small minority of states.127 Delaware has held that the 
UCC provisions on the sale of goods preempted the field, thus 
preventing extension of the doctrine of strict tort liability to the law of 
sales,128 but it did recognize strict tort liability in a bailment lease.129 A 
lower court in Virginia has followed Delaware.130 
Mason highlights the limitations of Massachusetts product liability 
law imposed by the refusal to adopt strict tort liability.131 Courts in 
other jurisdictions would allow strict liability claims on facts similar to 
those in Mason.132 In Long v. Yingling, for example, prospective 
                                                          
127 See sources cited supra note 3. 
128 Cline v. Prowler Inds. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 968 (Del. 1980); see also 
Franchetti v. Intercole Automation, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 454, 458 (D. Del. 1981) 
(holding that strict tort liability is inapplicable in an action for personal injuries 
caused by defective equipment manufactured and sold prior to effective date of 
UCC). 
129 Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581, 584 (Del. 1976) (holding that 
the legislature did not preempt field as to bailments and leases and the court was 
free to apply strict tort liability to a bailment lease). 
130 In Childs v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1988 WL 391503 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 24, 
1988), the court, relying in part on the Cline case, held that the UCC preempted 
strict tort liability. 
131 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 20 cmt. a (1998) 
(“After the promulgation of § 402A, courts began to extend strict liability for 
harm caused by product defects to some nonsale commercial transactions 
involving the distribution of products. Rather than stretching to call these 
transactions ‘sales,’ courts simply declared that the same policy objectives that 
supported strict liability in the sales context supported strict liability in other 
contexts. The first significant extension involved commercial product lessors. 
Although title does not pass in lease transactions, courts have reasoned that the 
same policy objectives that are served by holding commercial product sellers 
strictly liable also apply to commercial product lessors. Over time, courts have 
extended strict products liability to a wide range of nonsale, nonlease 
transactions.”). 
132 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 20, cmt. f (1998) 
(“Bailments typically involve short-term transfers of possession. Several 
categories of cases are fairly clear. When the defendant is in the business of 
selling the same type of product as is the subject of the bailment, the 
seller/bailor is subject to strict liability for harm caused by defects. Thus, an 
automobile dealer who allows a prospective customer to test-drive a 
demonstrator will be treated the same as a seller of the demonstrator car. Even 
when sale of a product is not contemplated, the commercial bailor is subject to 
strict liability if a charge is imposed as a condition of the bailment. Thus, a 
laundromat is subject to strict liability for a defective clothes dryer, and a roller 
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customers who were injured while test driving a used car could 
maintain a strict liability claim against the used car dealer.133 A most 
striking illustration of the difference between strict tort liability and 
warranty liability in a non-sale situation is O’Malley v. American 
LaFrance, Inc.134 A volunteer fireman was seriously injured while 
inspecting a partially-constructed fire truck that was being 
manufactured by the defendant under a contract with the fire 
department.135 The fireman brought strict tort liability and implied 
warranty claims against the manufacturer whose defense to both 
claims was that the product had not yet been placed into stream of 
commerce.136 The court, on a motion for summary judgment, rejected 
this defense with respect to the strict tort claim, but granted summary 
judgment on the warranty claim.137 
Finding that plaintiffs have not sustained their breach of 
warranties causes of action, while allowing for the possibility that 
their products liability claim is valid, is not an inconsistent result. 
Because a contract defines “tender of delivery” as one of its terms, 
and tort law defines “stream of commerce” as a jurisprudential 
term of art, a product can enter the stream of commerce without 
having been tendered for delivery. As discussed above, a car taken 
for a test drive enters the stream of commerce, and if a prospective 
purchaser is injured while on the test drive, the automobile dealer 
is liable under a products liability theory. However, because no 
contract of sale has been entered into, and therefore no tender of 
                                                                                                                                         
rink that rents skates is treated similarly. When products are made available as a 
convenience to customers who are on the defendant’s premises primarily for 
different, although related purposes, and no separate charge is made, strict 
liability is not imposed. Thus, bowling alleys that supply bowling balls for 
customer use and markets that supply shopping carts are not subject to strict 
products liability for harm caused by defects in those items. Similarly, doctors 
who use medical devices while treating patients are not considered distributors 
of those products.”). 
133 700 A.2d 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); see also Van Horn v. Reinhart Flynn Inc., 
No. 01-1794, 2003 WL 22719334 (Pa. Com. Pl., July 23, 2003) (permitting a 
strict liability claim by plaintiffs injured while test driving vehicle owned by 
defendant dealer). 
134 No. 00-CV-1421 (ARR), 2002 WL 32068354 at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2002). 
135 Id. at *1. 
136 Id. at *2. 
137 Id. at *9. 
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delivery pursuant to that contract has been made, the prospective 
purchaser does not have recourse to a breach of warranty claim.138 
3. The Problem of Samples and Other Freebies 
Consider another situation.139 Assume that a manufacturer, 
unsolicited and not in return for any consideration, sends a free sample 
of its product to the plaintiff. The product contains a “manufacturing 
defect.”140 The plaintiff is injured by the defect. The manufacturer was 
not negligent in making the product. 
In a strict liability jurisdiction, the plaintiff would have a claim: He 
was injured by a defective product that the manufacturer, a 
commercial entity, had distributed into the stream of commerce.141 
Does the plaintiff have any recourse in Massachusetts? There is, ex 
hypothesi, no negligence claim; the plaintiff’s remedy, if any, is for 
breach of warranty, but there hasn’t been a “sale”142 or a “lease,”143 
just a gift. 
                                                          
138 Id. (citing Mason v. General Motors Corp., 397 Mass. 183, 490 N.E.2d 437 
(1986) (interpreting Massachusetts’ codification of the U.C.C. and holding that a 
prospective purchaser injured during a test-drive does not have a breach of 
warranty cause of action)). 
139 This hypothetical was developed from an argument made by Justice Liacos in 
his dissent in Mason: 
 The test drive was a bailment for mutual benefit. The plaintiffs 
may have been able to demonstrate that the over-all transaction of 
an automobile sale or lease might include a bailment, which, 
standing alone, would otherwise seem to have been gratuitous, but 
as one part of the entire transaction, would come within the statute. 
 Mason v. Gen. Motors Corp., 490 N.E.2d 437, 445 (Liacos, J., dissenting) 
(footnotes omitted). 
140 “A product (a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from 
its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the 
preparation and marketing of the product.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998). 
141 Cf. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1967) ( “One 
who delivers an advertising sample to another with the expectation of profiting 
therefrom through future sales is in the same position as one who sells the 
product.”). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 20, 
Reporters’ Notes b (1998) (“[A] commercial entity is subject to strict liability 
for products it distributes free of charge, since title has passed to the 
consumer.”) and cases cited. 
142 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-106(1) (2010) (“A ‘sale’ consists in the passing 
of title from the seller to the buyer for a price . . . .”) 
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There is some authority for extending the warranty of 
merchantability to such gifts.144 One authority holds that: 
A distinction should be made between ‘pure’ gifts having no sales 
overtones, and those that are part of an advertising arrangement 
with the ultimate aim of making a sale. The former should be 
beyond the reach of the implied warranty of merchantability, 
whereas the latter can be considered so closely allied to selling as 
to become a sale for purposes of Section 2-314.145 
Sheppard v. Revlon, Inc. was a failure-to-warn case.146 The 
plaintiff obtained a jar of a wrinkle remover manufactured by Revlon 
by purchasing $5.00 worth of additional cosmetic products.147 She was 
injured when she applied the cream to her face near her eyes.148 The 
jar contained no warning against use near the eyes.149 One of the 
defenses to the warranty claim was that the transaction was a gift, not a 
sale.150 The court rejected this argument because the plaintiff 
“obtained the merchandise as a result of performing an act required, 
to-wit: purchasing $5.00, or more, of Revlon cosmetics at one time,”151 
thus satisfying the statutory definition of the passing of title for a 
price.152 The SJC and most other courts would most likely agree with 
this conclusion. The “free gift” was part of what the plaintiff bought. 
In E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Kaufman & Chernick, Inc., 
the SJC reached a similar result when a retailer advertised that 
customers who bought a tire at a price below the regular selling price 
would also receive a can of the manufacturer’s anti-freeze 
                                                                                                                                         
143 § 2A-103(1)(j) (“‘Lease’ means a transfer of the right to possession and use of 
goods for a term in return for consideration, but a sale, including a sale on 
approval or a sale or return, or retention or creation of a security interest is not a 
lease.”). 
144 See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & LINDA J. RUSCH, 1 HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 2-
314:3 (West 2012). 
145 Id., cited in Mason v. General Motors Corp., 490 N.E.2d 437, 445 n.3 (Liacos, 
J., dissenting). 
146 Sheppard v. Revlon, Inc., 267 So.2d 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). 
147 Id. at 663. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 664. 
151 Id. 
152 Supra note 142. 
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(“Zerex”).153 The anti-freeze was a product covered by a “fair trade 
law,” then in effect, under which it was illegal to sell a product at less 
than the “fair trade” price.154 The manufacturer sued to enjoin the 
retailer from selling its product at a price lower than the minimum 
permissible retail price.155 The retailer defended on the ground that 
there had not been a sale of the anti-freeze, only a gift.156 
It is plain that in the case before us the delivery of Zerex to a 
customer in connection with and as a part of the sale of the tire was 
not, in fact or in law, a ‘gift.’ The money paid the defendant by the 
purchaser was paid not for the tire alone, but for both items. 
Legally and economically the transaction amounted to a combined 
sale of both the Zerex and the tire for a single price.157 
This is certainly consistent with the holding of Sheppard.158 The 
Sheppard court went further, however. Even if the “transaction was 
not a sale, nevertheless, warranty liability may be imposed. Such 
liability is not intended to be limited only to a sales contract or only to 
the direct parties . . . .”159 In support of this proposition, the court cited 
one of the UCC official comments to section 2-313: 
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to 
warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for 
sale, the warranty sections of this Article are not designed in any 
way to disturb those lines of case law growth which have 
recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales 
contracts or to the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise 
in other appropriate circumstances such as in the case of bailments 
for hire, whether such bailment is itself the main contract or is 
merely a supplying of containers under a contract for the sale of 
their contents. The provisions of Section 2-318 on third party 
beneficiaries expressly recognize this case law development within 
one particular area. Beyond that, the matter is left to the case law 
                                                          
153 E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Kaufman & Chernick, Inc., 148 N.E.2d 634, 
635 (Mass. 1958). 
154 Id. 
155 Id at 634. 
156 Id. at 636. 
157 Id. 
158 Sheppard v. Revlon, Inc., 267 So.2d 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). 
159 Id. at 664. 
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with the intention that the policies of this Act may offer useful 
guidance in dealing with further cases as they arise.160 
Returning to the hypothetical, the sample here really is “free” in 
the sense that it is not part of a package deal. There are certainly “sales 
overtones” in the transaction, but no sale. Could the plaintiff recover in 
Massachusetts?161 Justice Liacos apparently thought that Mason would 
preclude liability.162 The Mason majority apparently thought that this 
was the result intended by the legislature when it enacted the product 
liability amendments. What’s wrong with this picture? 
The products liability amendments, as interpreted by the SJC, have 
left a gap in Massachusetts law. The official comment to section 2-
313, quoted above, states that the warranty provisions of the Code “are 
not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth 
which have recognized that warranties need not be confined . . . to 
sales contracts.”163 The comment states that the provisions of section 
2-318 recognize the development of the case law.164 The 
Massachusetts legislature enacted a non-uniform version of section 2-
318 that goes beyond the most expansive of the three official 
alternative versions of the section. The court, however, has interpreted 
this pro-consumer action by the legislature as freezing the 
development of product liability law and thereby preventing the 
expansion of warranty liability beyond sales and leases and precluding 
the court from recognizing strict tort liability in these situations. 
                                                          
160 U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 2 (1977). Section 2-313 deals with express warranties. “The 
word ‘Article’ shows that this assertion applies to other warranties as well as to 
the express warranties discussed in Section 2-313.” WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & 
LINDA J. RUSCH, 1 HAWKLAND UCC SERIES § 2-314:3 (West 2012). 
161 In Neuhoff v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., the plaintiff bought 60 windows 
from the defendant in 1991. 370 F.3d 197, 200 (1st Cir. 2004). In 1998, as a 
result of problems with the windows, the defendant offered to replace 33 of 
them for free. Id. In 2000, four of the replacement windows had reached a state 
of decay. Id. The court held that providing free replacement windows was more 
akin to a gift than a sale and therefore there was no implied warranty on the 
windows. Id. at 205. Unlike the situation where the “gift” is really part of a 
combined sale, the replacement windows were not coupled with any other 
transaction. Id. 
162 Mason v. Gen. Motors Corp., 490 N.E.2 437, 444–45 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
163 U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 2 (1977). 
164 Id. 
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4. Merging Warranty and Negligence Liability 
It is, perhaps, unrealistic to hope that the court would change its 
interpretation of the preemptive effect of the product liability 
amendments. The court has, however, been willing to revisit other 
aspects of product liability law.165 For example, as discussed earlier,166 
the court in the Jacobs case cut back on the expansive interpretation of 
the abolition of the privity requirement in section 2-318. 
A second area in which the court has significantly changed its 
interpretation of product liability law (and the scope of its authority) 
relates to the nature of warranty liability in failure-to-warn cases. 
Some background is necessary to appreciate the significance of this 
change. 
Unlike most jurisdictions, which recognize some form of a 
comparative fault defense in products liability cases,167 Massachusetts 
law allows such a defense only in negligence actions.168 The leading 
case is Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.169 Correia began in the 
federal district court, which certified several questions of law to the 
SJC.170 One of the questions was whether “Massachusetts recognize[s] 
                                                          
165 See supra Part II.B.. 
166 See supra Part II.B.3. 
167 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17 cmt. a. (1998) 
(“A strong majority of jurisdictions apply the comparative responsibility 
doctrine to products liability actions. Courts today do not limit the relevance of 
plaintiff’s fault as did the Restatement (Second) of Torts to conduct 
characterized as voluntary assumption of the risk.”). 
168 The court’s refusal to recognize a comparative defense to product liability 
claims, not based on negligence, has been the subject of criticism. See, e.g., 
David R. Geiger & Stephanie Copp Martinez, Design and Warning Defect 
Claims Under Massachusetts Product Liability Law: Completing the Merger of 
Negligence and Warranty, 43 BOSTON B.J. 12 (1999), and Alex Grant, The 
Evolution of Massachusetts Products Liability Law and the Conundrum of Strict 
Liability, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 32-44 (2011). The court itself has stated: 
“[W]e believe that application of some type of apportionment principles to 
warranty cases may be fairer than the current system, and may make results in 
negligence and warranty counts in the same case more consistent with each 
other.” Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1315 (Mass. 1988) 
(citation and footnote omitted). Cautiously, the court added that “‘given the 
wide variety of possible solutions,’ . . . and the serious policy considerations 
involved, the Legislature is the appropriate forum to select from among the 
competing proposals.” Id. 
169 Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. 1983). 
170 Id. 
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contributory or comparative negligence or fault as a full or partial 
defense to an action for personal injury or wrongful death based on 
breach of warranty.”171 The court analyzed the question in two parts. 
The court held first that the statute, by its terms, was applicable 
only to negligence claims.172 Strict liability claims do not sound in 
negligence, and the court rejected the view that strict liability is 
effectively negligence per se.173 
The court then considered whether it would adopt some form of 
comparative fault as a common-law defense to a warranty claim.174 
The court “decline[d] to take such action. To do so would be to meld 
improperly the theory of negligence with the theory of warranty as 
expressed in [M.]G.L. c. 106, §§ 2-314–2-318, and thereby to undercut 
the policies supporting these statutes.”175 The different policies behind 
negligence and strict liability justify this result. 
[T]he policy of negligence liability presumes that people will, or at 
least should, take reasonable measures to protect themselves and 
others from harm. This presumption justifies the imposition of a 
duty on people to conduct themselves in this way. A person 
harmed by one whose conduct “falls below the standard 
established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable 
risk,” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282 (1965), may recover 
against the actor. However, if the injured person’s unreasonable 
conduct also has been a cause of his injury, his conduct will be 
accounted for in apportioning liability or damages.176 
                                                          
171 Id. at 1039. 
172 Id. at 1037. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (2010) (“Contributory 
negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by any person or legal 
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury 
to person or property, if such negligence was not greater than the total amount of 
negligence attributable to the person or persons against whom recovery is 
sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the 
amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or 
death recovery is made. In determining by what amount the plaintiff’s damages 
shall be diminished in such a case, the negligence of each plaintiff shall be 
compared to the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought. 
The combined total of the plaintiff’s negligence taken together with all of the 
negligence of all defendants shall equal one hundred per cent.”). 
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The policy behind strict liability, however, is to prevent the release 
of dangerously defective products into the stream of commerce, a duty 
unknown in negligence law and not dischargeable by the exercise of 
due care.177 
The liability issue focuses on whether the product was defective 
and unreasonably dangerous and not on the conduct of the user or 
the seller. Given this focus, the only duty imposed on the user is to 
act reasonably with respect to a product which he knows to be 
defective and dangerous.178 
A violation of this duty is the only defense based on the plaintiff’s 
conduct to a warranty claim that the court recognized, a defense that 
has come to be known as the Correia or the “unreasonable use,” 
defense.179 The Correia defense is not something mandated by the 
product liability amendments or the rest of the Code. It derives from 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, comment n.180 It is a 
common-law defense that the SJC adopted from section 402A and read 
into the Code. Having done that, the court simultaneously decided that 
                                                          
177 Id. at 1040. 
178 Id. 
179 Haglund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315, 319 & n.2 (Mass. 2006). 
 The elements of this defense, as set forth in Correia and clarified in subsequent 
cases, are: (1) The plaintiff knows that the product is defective in some way—
technical specificity is not required. (2) The plaintiff knows that the product is 
dangerous. With that subjective knowledge, the plaintiff uses the product in a 
way that is (3) voluntary and (4) objectively unreasonable. And, needless to say, 
(5) the plaintiff is injured by the product. Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040; Allen v. 
Chance Mfg. Co., 494 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Mass. 1986); Haglund, 847 N.E.2d at 
323–24; Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 16–17, 19 (1st Cir. 
2001). 
180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 402A cmt. n (1965) 
(“Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this Section deals is 
not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to 
strict liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff 
is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover 
the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On 
the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily 
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly 
passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as 
in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and 
is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of 
the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.”). 
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it was up to the legislature to change the law,181 a position reiterated, 
somewhat wistfully, five years later in Colter v. Barber-Greene Co.182 
One way in which a product can be defective for purposes of 
product liability law is if it lacks an adequate warning.183 This can be 
the basis of a negligence action. The duty to warn is premised on 
actual or constructive notice of the danger.184 “A manufacturer of a 
product has a duty to warn foreseeable users of dangers in the use of 
that product of which he knows or should have known.”185 The lack of 
an adequate warning can also constitute a breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability.186 In one of the seminal cases in 
Massachusetts product liability law, the court made the following 
statement: 
For strict liability purposes, and therefore for purposes of our 
warranty law, the adequacy of a warning is measured by the 
warning that would be given at the time of sale by an ordinarily 
prudent vendor who, at that time, is fully aware of the risks 
presented by the product. A defendant vendor is held to that 
standard regardless of the knowledge of risks that he actually had 
or reasonably should have had when the sale took place. The 
vendor is presumed to have been fully informed at the time of the 
sale of all risks. The state of the art is irrelevant, as is the 
culpability of the defendant. Goods that, from the consumer’s 
perspective, are unreasonably dangerous due to lack of adequate 
warning, are not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods 
are used regardless of the absence of fault on the vendor’s 
part. . . . Liability is imposed as a matter of social policy. . . . The 
finding that [the defendant] did not breach its warranty, therefore, 
necessarily implied that the warning given was adequate regardless 
of when the risk to be warned about was discovered or was 
discoverable.187 
The court was apparently saying that a manufacturer might be held 
liable in warranty for failure to warn of a defect that was not only 
                                                          
181 Correia, 446 N.E.2d at 1040–41. 
182 See Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 525 N.E.2d 1305, 1315 (Mass. 1988), quoted 
supra note 168. 
183 See e.g., Mitchell v. Sky Climber, Inc., 487 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Mass. 1986); 
Yates v. Norton Co., 525 N.E.2d 1317, 1320 (Mass. 1988). 
184 Mitchell, at 1376. 
185 Id. 
186 E.g., Yates, 525 N.E.2d at 1320. 
187 Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277–78 (Mass.1984) (emphasis in 
original) (citations omitted). 
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unknown but also scientifically unknowable at the time of 
manufacture. The issue of the “state of the art” in warning cases under 
Massachusetts law next arose in a series of diversity cases in the 
federal courts.188 These courts all held that the statement in Hayes was 
mere dictum and that state of the art evidence was admissible and 
highly relevant in a breach of warranty case for a failure to warn.189 
When the issue was next before the SJC, however, the court went out 
of its way to set the matter straight: 
[The defendant] argues that the quoted passage from Hayes is not 
an accurate statement of Massachusetts law. In order to dissipate 
any confusion on this matter, we take this occasion to emphasize 
that the quoted language does indeed state Massachusetts law 
accurately, and, we think, clearly. As we said in Correia v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., in connection with the application of 
strict liability principles to breach of warranty cases, “the liability 
issue focuses on whether the product was defective and 
unreasonably dangerous and not on the conduct of the user or the 
seller.” We adhere to these views.190 
Six years later, however, the court abandoned its position and 
significantly altered Massachusetts law in Vassallo v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp. 191 The Vassallo court stated: 
[A] defendant will not be held liable under an implied warranty of 
merchantability for failure to warn or provide instructions about 
risks that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of sale or 
could not have been discovered by way of reasonable testing prior 
to marketing the product. A manufacturer will be held to the 
standard of knowledge of an expert in the appropriate field, and 
will remain subject to a continuing duty to warn (at least 
                                                          
188 In re Mass. Asbestos Cases, 639 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1985); Collins v. Ex-
Cello-O Corp., 629 F. Supp. 540, 542–43 (D. Mass. 1986), aff’d mem., 815 F.2d 
691 (1st Cir. 1987); Anderson v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,799 F.2d 1, 1, 4 (1st Cir. 
1986) (“[The district court] considered the law of Massachusetts as a whole, and 
concluded that, notwithstanding the Hayes dictum, Massachusetts law requires a 
seller to warn only of reasonably foreseeable or scientifically discoverable 
dangers. We agree in all respects with the court’s resolution.” “We believe the 
Hayes dictum is not the law.”); Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217 
(1st Cir. 1990), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215, after remand, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 
1992). 
189 See id. 
190 Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 596 N.E.2d 318, 320 n.3 (Mass.1992) 
(internal citation omitted). 
191 Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp, 696 N.E.2d 909, 923–24 (Mass. 1998). 
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purchasers) of risks discovered following the sale of the product at 
issue.192 
The changes made by Vassallo were continued in two cases 
decided on the same day: Hoffman v. Houghton Chemical Corp.193 and 
Lewis v. Ariens Co.194 
Hoffman is particularly significant. In Hoffman, the court dealt 
with the “bulk supplier doctrine,” under which the manufacturer or 
supplier of bulk products may satisfy its duty to warn end users by 
reasonable reliance on an intermediary who understands the risks 
involved and is able to pass on warnings about the risks to end 
users.195 The court “adopt[ed] the bulk supplier doctrine as an 
affirmative defense to products liability negligence claims.”196 The 
court then turned to products liability warranty claims: 
In [Vassallo], we implicitly recognized that negligent failure to 
warn and failure to warn under breach of warranty are to be judged 
by the same standard: the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions 
in the circumstances. We expressly recognize that convergence 
now. Under our holding in Vassallo, then, an instruction on the 
bulk supplier doctrine may apply to both a claim of negligent 
failure to warn and a claim of breach of warranty failure to warn in 
products liability actions.197 
In Lewis, the court dealt with another type of warning issue: 
whether a manufacturer has a continuing, post-sale duty to warn.198 
The court adopted the principles of Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability section 10.199 The most important thing, for present 
                                                          
192 Id.. 
193 Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848 (Mass. 2001). 
194 Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 2001). 
195 Hoffman, at 854, 857. 
196 Id. at 857. 
197 Id. at 859–60 (footnotes omitted). 
198 Id. at 863–64. 
199 Lewis, 751 N.E.2d at 866 n.12. Section 10 states: 
(a) One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing 
products is subject to liability for harm to persons or property 
caused by the seller’s failure to provide a warning after the time of 
sale or distribution of a product if a reasonable person in the 
seller’s position would provide such a warning. 
(b) A reasonable person in the seller’s position would provide a 
warning after the time of sale if: (1) the seller knows or reasonably 
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purposes, is that the court reiterated that in Vassallo the court had 
“implicitly recognized that negligent failure to warn and failure to 
warn under breach of warranty are to be judged by the same standard: 
the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions in the circumstances.”200 
The court, in this line of cases, has thus judicially brought about 
what, in Correia, it had said was up to the legislature to do: the 
merger, at least in failure-to-warn cases, of negligence liability with 
warranty liability.201 
The Mason case precluded warranty liability where there is no 
sale.202 We have considered other situations—the self-service case, the 
untendered goods case, the gift case—in which there is no sale or 
contract for sale, as those terms are defined in the UCC.203 We posit 
that the product contained a manufacturing defect, not caused by the 
                                                                                                                                         
should know that the product poses a substantial risk of harm to 
persons or property; and (2) those to whom a warning might be 
provided can be identified and can reasonably be assumed to be 
unaware of the risk of harm; and (3) a warning can be effectively 
communicated to and acted on by those to whom a warning might 
be provided; and (4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify 
the burden of providing a warning. 
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 10 (1998). 
200 Lewis, at 866 n.12. 
201 Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1040–41 (Mass. 
1983). These cases also undermine the policy reasons that the Correia court 
gave for not allowing apportionment of damages in a warranty case. The court 
refused to adopt the principles of comparative negligence in Correia because 
“[t]o do so would be to meld improperly the theory of negligence with the 
theory of warranty as expressed in [M.]G.L. c. 106, §§ 2-314–2-318, and 
thereby to undercut the policies supporting these statutes.” Id. at 1039. 
 The duty imposed by the law of strict liability “is unknown in the law of 
negligence and it is not fulfilled even if the seller takes all reasonable measures 
to make his product safe. The liability issue focuses on whether the product was 
defective and unreasonably dangerous and not on the conduct of the user or the 
seller.” Id. at 1040. 
 That has changed. The focus in warning cases, whatever the label put on the 
plaintiff’s theory of recovery, now is on the conduct of the seller, and the 
standard by which that conduct is judged is reasonableness. When the inevitable 
case arises in which a negligent plaintiff brings a warranty claim based on a 
failure to warn, the court should complete what it has begun and recognize a 
comparative responsibility defense to the claim. See generally Geiger & 
Martinez, supra note 168. 
202 Mason v. Gen. Motors Corp., 490 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1986). 
203 See U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2011). 
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manufacturer’s negligence. A Massachusetts plaintiff injured by the 
product would most likely not be able to recover in these cases: 
There’s no negligence, no warranty, no strict liability. 
This anomalous result, ungrounded in public policy,204 is the 
consequence of the court’s interpretation of the legislature’s intent in 
adopting the product liability amendments. It is perhaps a forlorn hope 
that the court would reconsider its interpretation of the preemptive 
effect of the product liability amendments. There oughta be a law. If 
the court is precluded from extending warranty liability to these cases 
or from recognizing a common-law remedy apart from negligence, the 
legislature should act to plug this gap in Massachusetts product 
liability law by enacting a statute that would impose strict liability on a 
manufacturer for injuries caused by a defective product that the 
manufacturer had introduced into the stream of commerce, regardless 
of whether there was a sale or lease and regardless of whether the 
manufacturer was negligent. 
B. The Statute of Limitations Problem Caused by Section 2-
318. 
Most of the problems with respect to the statute of limitations 
applicable to various warranty claims, as discussed in Part II.B.2, were 
resolved—and properly so—in the Bay State-Spray case. There are 
some problems raised by the product liability amendments that are yet 
to be decided, problems resulting from warranty law doing double 
duty and from inconsistent draftsmanship. 
The Jacobs case was concerned solely with the privity issue: 
whether the consumer-buyer could maintain a contract-based warranty 
action directly against the manufacturer.205 The statute of limitations 
was not an issue in the case. The plaintiff bought the motorcycle in 
April 1983 and commenced the action against the dealer in June 1984. 
The manufacturer was added as a defendant in July 1986.206 What if 
the plaintiff had brought suit in May 1986, more than three, but less 
than four years after the tender of delivery? 
Jacobs raises questions about the statute of limitations applicable 
to a contract-based warranty claim by a non-privity buyer of consumer 
goods. In Bay State-Spray, it should be remembered, the (commercial) 
                                                          
204 Grant, supra note 3, at 78. 
205 Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. 1995). 
206 Id. at 759–60. For purpose of the statute of limitations, the amended complaint 
would relate back to the date of the original complaint. MASS. R. CIV. P. 15(c). 
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buyer was suing a component manufacturer, a remote seller with 
whom it was not in privity. The privity issue was not pressed by the 
defendant.207 Nonetheless, as the court noted, the section 2-318 statute 
of limitations did literally apply to the case.208 The relevant sentence in 
section 2-318 contains a significant phrase: “All actions under this 
section shall be commenced within three years next after the date the 
injury and damage occurs.”209 The Bay State-Spray court completely 
ignored this language, focusing rather on the legislative purpose 
underlying section 2-318 and the substantive nature of the warranty 
claim in question to conclude that section 2-318’s statute of limitation 
applied to a tort-based warranty claim. 210 
Nevertheless, Bay State-Spray was a warranty claim brought by a 
non-privity buyer. Lack of privity was not an issue by virtue of section 
2-318’s abolition of the defense, and the action was, technically, 
brought under that section. The same (correct) result would have been 
reached, had the court concluded that section 2-318 was inapplicable 
to commercial warranty claims—an interpretation strongly hinted at in 
Jacobs211 and arrived at in a series of decisions by the federal 
courts.212 
The focus in Bay State-Spray was entirely on choosing the 
appropriate statute of limitations. Lack of privity and the applicability 
of section 2-318 were very much the focus in Jacobs. The court held 
that a consumer buyer, under section 2-318, could directly sue the 
manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.213 
Therefore, such an action would be an action “under this section.” It is 
unlikely that the court would apply the section 2-318 statute of 
limitations to the case, however, based on the policy reasons 
                                                          
207 Bay State-Spray & Provincetown S.S., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 533 
N.E.2d 1350, 1353 n.4 (Mass. 1989). 
208 Id. at 1353. 
209 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (as amended by St. 1974, c. 153) (emphasis 
added). 
210 Bay State-Spray, 533 N.E.2d at 1352–53. 
211 Jacobs, 649 N.E.2d at 763 (Contract-based warranty claims involving 
commercial transactions may generally call for different treatment than tort-
based warranty claims). 
212 See, e.g., Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 70, 99 (D. Mass. 1998). 
213 Jacobs, 649 N.E.2d at 762–63 (where the court placed great emphasis on the 
fact that § 2-318 refers to “damages,” rather than “injury to the person,” and is 
thus not limited to recovery for personal injury). 
2013 Benevolent Maleficence 55 
articulated in Bay State-Spray. But it would be doing so at the cost of 
ignoring the actual language of the statute.214 
The reverse situation—the case of a buyer who is in privity with 
the seller and brings a tort-warranty claim—is equally problematic. 
The policy reasons for applying the three-year limitation and the 
accrual rule of section 2-318 to the claim are compelling, but the 
privity buyer’s action is unquestionably not brought “under this 
section.” 
Had the statute of limitations been an issue in Jacobs or were a 
privity buyer to bring a tort-warranty claim against his direct seller 
more than three years after the injury or damage, but within four years 
of the tender of delivery, the court would most likely apply the four-
year statute in the former case and the three-year one in the latter. To 
reach this result, though, the court would have to act like a finicky 
gourmet at a smorgasbord, picking one morsel from section 2-318 and 
another from section 2-725, to arrive at a palatable result, an exercise 
that would be unnecessary if strict tort liability had been on the menu 
in the first place. 
The irony in all this is that the plaintiff in either case would have 
four years to bring suit anyway. The statute of limitations applicable to 
the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act215 is four years.216 
Chapter 93A prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce.”217 It creates a cause of action in 
favor of both consumers and businesses who are injured by a violation 
of the statute.218 
The Attorney General is authorized to promulgate regulations 
under chapter 93A.219 Some of the regulations bear on product liability 
cases. The most important of them is section 3.08(2) of the Code of 
Massachusetts Regulations, Title 940, which declares it an unfair or 
                                                          
214 Bay State-Spray, 533 N.E.2d at 1355 n.8 (stating that “[w]e would also reject 
any suggestion that the statute of limitation of § 2-318 would apply to an 
original purchaser’s contract-based claim for economic loss as well.”). 
215 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A (2010). 
216 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 5A. 
217 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2(a). 
218 See id. §§ 9, 11. 
219 See id. § 2(c). 
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deceptive act or practice “to fail to perform or fulfill any promises or 
obligations arising under a warranty.”220 
Chapter 93A applies to a product liability tort-warranty claim for 
personal injury, at least where negligence is involved,221 or for 
property damage.222 
If the warranty claim is brought under chapter 93A, the applicable 
statute of limitations is the four-year period of section 5A, even though 
the same claim, if brought under the UCC, would be governed by the 
three-year limitation period of section 2-318.223 
These questions of the interpretation of section 2-318, though 
hardly insoluble, are the result of the legislature attempting to make 
warranty law do double duty. In drafting section 2-318, the legislature 
may not have foreseen the problems it would create by attempting to 
solve the product liability problem in the way it did. The kitchen sink 
approach employed by the legislature created a number of ambiguities 
about the application of the section. The statute of limitations issues 
are, perhaps, the least of the problems; but they are nonetheless 
examples of issues that could have been avoided if the legislature had 
itself created a cause of action for strict tort liability or not taken the 
steps it did take that were interpreted by the court as precluding 
judicial recognition of strict tort liability. 
The legislature’s treatment of the statute of limitation applicable to 
product liability warranty actions highlights another anomaly of 
Massachusetts product liability law. The obvious intent of the 
legislature when it put a three-year limitation period in section 2-318 
                                                          
220 940 MASS. CODE REGS. secs. 3.01, 3.08 (establishing that the definition of 
warranty includes the three warranties of quality that can arise under the UCC: 
express warranties and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose). Not every breach of warranty is automatically a violation of 
chapter 93A. See Sherry L. Rajaniemi-Gregg & Michael D. Weisman, Products 
Liability Claims Pursuant to Chapter 93A, in CHAPTER 93A RIGHTS AND 
REMEDIES § 15.2.2 (2010) (discussing warranty claims giving rise to a chapter 
93A claim). That issue is outside the scope of this article. For purposes of this 
discussion, it is assumed the warranty claim does give rise to a chapter 93A 
claim. 
221 Maillet v. ATF-Davidson Co., 552 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Mass. 1990) (failing to reach 
the issue of whether chapter 93A liability would be imposed where the breach of 
warranty was not negligent). 
222 E.g., Fine v. Huygens, DiMella, Shaffer & Assocs., 783 N.E.2d 842 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2003). 
223 Id. at 846, 848–849; see also Mahoney v. Baldwin, 543 N.E.2d 435 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 1989) (discussing how § 5A applies to consumer protection claims). 
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was that tort-warranty claims and negligence claims would be subject 
to the same limitation period. That policy is undercut by the four-year 
limitation applicable to chapter 93A claims based on breach of 
warranty. The legislature should consider amending section 5A to 
make it consistent with section 2-318 and thus provide a uniform 
three-year limitation period for all product liability claims, whether 
those claims are based on negligence, breach of warranty, or an unfair 
or deceptive act or practice. 
C. The Slam-Dunk, Nuclear Booby-Trap: The Notice 
Requirement 
One of the encumbrances of the law of sales that is still part of 
Massachusetts product liability law is the notice requirement. 
You know that something variously described as “a booby-trap,”224 
“an obvious threat,”225 “a very rough rule,”226 “the ‘slam-dunk’ 
provision,”227 “a thunderbolt out of the sky,”228 and even “a nuclear 
bomb,”229 might cause a problem or two. 
The notice requirement of sales law is one of the encumbrances of 
Massachusetts products liability law precisely because of the way that 
law has developed. The lack of a notice requirement—a contract 
defense—was one of the selling points of strict tort liability when that 
theory was in its infancy. The Greenman case, which got the strict 
liability ball rolling, regarded the contract-based notice requirement of 
the Sales Act as inappropriate in an action brought by an injured 
                                                          
224 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 691 (5th 
ed. 1984) (“Both the Sales Act and the Commercial Code contain provisions 
which prevent the buyer from recovering on a warranty unless he gives notice to 
the seller within a reasonable time after he knows, or ought to know, of the 
breach. As between the immediate parties to the sale, this is a sound commercial 
rule, designed to protect the seller against unduly delayed claims for damages. 
As applied to personal injuries, and notice to a remote seller, it becomes a 
booby-trap for the unwary.” (footnote omitted)). 
225 1 THOMAS M. QUINN, QUINN’S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY 
AND LAW DIGEST §§ 2-607[B][3], 2-607[A][5][a] (rev. 2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 
2011) (citations omitted). 
226 Id. at § 2-607[A][5][a]. 
227 18 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 52:42 (4th ed.). 
228 Barkley Clark, First Line of Defense in Warranty Suits: Failure to Give Notice 
of Breach, 15 UCC L.J. 105, 105 (1982). 
229 William H. Henning & William H. Lawrence, A Unified Rationale for Section 2-
607(3)(a) Notification, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 573, 575 (2009). 
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consumer against a remote seller.230 The Restatement took a similar 
position.231 
The fact that there is any notice requirement in a product liability 
case is a problem that could and should have been avoided by the 
legislature at the outset. First, the notice requirement itself is not 
applicable to every warranty claim, but only to claims by actual 
buyers. The courts that have interpreted section 2-318 to impose a 
notice requirement—without actually considering the issue—on non-
buyer warranty beneficiaries are wrong. Second, if these decisions are 
what the legislature intended when it enacted the product liability 
amendments, then the legislature got it wrong and should act to bring 
Massachusetts product liability law into line with the rest of the 
country by abolishing the notice requirement in warranty claims for 
personal injury. This section of the article also discusses the problems 
of interpretation created by the legislature when it included a provision 
about notice in section 2-318. 
1. Background 
The notice requirement imposed by section 2-607(3)(a) states, “(3) 
Where a tender has been accepted . . . (a) the buyer must within a 
reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any 
breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any 
remedy . . . .”232 This provision derives from section 49 of the Uniform 
Sales Act, the predecessor of Article 2 of the UCC.233 
                                                          
230 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). 
231 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1965) (“The rule stated in 
this Section is not governed by the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, or those 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is not affected by 
limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by limitation to ‘buyer’ 
and ‘seller’ in those statutes. Nor is the consumer required to give notice to the 
seller of his injury within a reasonable time after it occurs, as is provided by the 
Uniform Act”). 
232 Id. 
233 Unif. Sales Act. § 49, 1A U.L.A. 99 (1950) (“In the absence of express or 
implied agreement of the parties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall not 
discharge the seller from liability in damages or other legal remedy for breach of 
any promise or warranty in the contract to sell or the sale. But, if, after 
acceptance of the goods, the buyer fail to give notice to the seller of the breach 
of any promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or 
ought to know of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor.”). 
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The rule is not an ancient feature of our law of sales. Professor 
Samuel Williston introduced the rule into our law in section 49 of 
his 1906 draft of the Uniform Sales Act, in part drawing his 
inspiration from a provision in the German Commercial Code. The 
common law still does not recognize such a rule. . . . 234 
The official comments, courts, and commentators have identified a 
number of purposes that the notice requirement serves,235 such as the 
investigation and settlement of claims; the prevention of commercial 
bad faith; the repair or replacement of the non-conforming goods or 
other cure; protection of the seller’s right to inspect the goods; 
mitigation of damages; and staleness.236 Some of these purposes, such 
as the replacement of non-conforming goods, are relevant only to 
commercial or, at least, to contract-based warranty claims. The 
purposes of the notice requirement in product liability warranty cases 
that have been identified by the Massachusetts courts are to inform the 
seller of the breach and thus allow for settlement of the case,237 to 
allow the defendant to gather evidence in a timely way, and to prevent 
surprise by a suit years after the sale.238 
The effect of not giving sufficient notice under section 2-607(3)(a) 
is draconian: “[T]he buyer must within a reasonable time after he 
discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of 
breach or be barred from any remedy . . . .”239 Section 2-318 in 
Massachusetts mitigates the harshness of this rule: “Failure to give 
                                                          
234 John C. Reitz, Against Notice: A Proposal to Restrict the Notice of Claims Rule 
in U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a), 73 CORNELL L. REV. 534, 534–35 (1988) (footnotes 
omitted). 
235 Henning & Lawrence, supra note 229, at 574; Harry G. Prince, Overprotecting 
the Consumer? Section 2-607(3)(a) Notice of Breach in Nonprivity Contexts, 66 
N.C. L. REV. 107, 115–16 (1987); Jerry J. Phillips, Notice of Breach in Sales 
and Strict Tort Liability Law: Should There Be a Difference?, 47 IND. L.J. 457, 
465–70 (1972). 
236 Phillips, supra note 235, at 465; Reitz, supra note 234, at 540–41; see also 
Henning & Lawrence, supra note 229, at 576–78 (arguing for a prejudice-based 
treatment of the notice requirement as exemplified by the proposed amended 
section, UCC § 2-607(3)(a) (2003)). 
237 Smith v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 410 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Delano Growers’ Coop. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., 473 N.E.2d 1066, 1072 
(Mass. 1985)). 
238 Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 449 (1st Cir. 1997). 
239 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-607(3)(a) (2010). 
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notice shall not bar recovery under this section unless the defendant 
proves that he was prejudiced thereby.”240 
In order to prevail on the prejudice defense, a defendant must 
prove two things: an unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice.241 
First, the defendant must show that there was an unreasonable delay in 
giving notice.242 This is a factual question and depends on the 
reasonableness of the buyer’s conduct in the circumstances.243 This 
“thorny issue”244 is the more difficult of the two factors. In some cases, 
the delay has been found unreasonable as a matter of law or the 
plaintiff has not contested the issue.245 In other cases, the issue was 
held to be a jury question.246 
Second, the defendant must make the “relatively easy”247 showing 
that the delay caused prejudice. It is not necessary to show formal 
prejudice. It suffices that the delay could have deprived the defendant 
of useful evidence or prevented the defendant from fully investigating 
the circumstances of the case and thus developing evidence, and it is 
not necessary to show that the lost evidence would have changed the 
result.248 
                                                          
240 Id. § 2-318 (emphasis added). 
241 E.g., Henrick v. Coats Co., 458 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984); 
Robertshaw, 410 F.3d at 36. 
242 E.g., Sacramona, 106 F.3d at 448–49. 
243 Robertshaw, 410 F.3d at 35. 
244 Sacramona, 106 F.3d at 449. 
245 Id. at 449 (filing of notice three years after the injury was “plainly delayed”); 
Robertshaw, 410 F.3d at 36 (filing of notice three years after the injury was not 
contested by plaintiff). 
246 Castro v. Stanley Works, 864 F.2d 961, 963 (1st Cir. 1989) (20 month delay; 
jury found prejudice); Henrick v. Coats Co., 458 N.E.2d 773,774–75 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1984) (No notice other than filing complaint three years after injury; 
issue should have been submitted to jury); Chapman ex rel. Estate of Chapman 
v. Bernard’s Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 406, 415 (D. Mass. 2001) (where a three-year 
delay was a material question of fact); Cameo Curtains, Inc. v. Philip Carey 
Corp., 416 N.E.2d 995, 998 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (the notice was not found to 
be delayed when given by plaintiff as soon as the defect in the product was 
known to the plaintiff); New London County Ins. Co. v. Broan Nutone, LLC, 
No. BACV 20020130, 2006 WL 2221838, at *2–*3 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 3, 
2006) (holding that a twenty-five day delay was not unreasonable as a matter of 
law). 
247 Sacramona, 106 F.3d at 449. 
248 Id.; Castro, 864 F.2d. at 964; Chapman, 167 F. Supp.2d at 415. 
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It is irrelevant that the plaintiff may also have been prejudiced, nor 
does it matter that a third party may have been responsible for the 
loss.249 
Failure to give notice bars recovery, of course, only if there was an 
obligation to give notice in the first place. 
2. When Is Notice Required in Massachusetts? 
Who must give notice to whom in a product liability warranty case 
for personal injury? In the case of a buyer suing his immediate seller 
for breach of warranty, there is no question that the buyer is required 
to give the seller notice even if the claim is for personal injury. That is 
simply what the Code says.250 The plaintiff in Nugent v. Popular 
Markets, Inc. was injured by wood splinters in a jar of berries that he 
purchased from the defendant supermarket.251 The defendant 
challenged the sufficiency of the notice because the letter sent by the 
plaintiff did not give the date of the sale.252 Noting that the UCC notice 
requirements were intended to be “less rigorous” than those under the 
Sales Act, the court held that the notice was sufficient under section 2-
607(3)(a).253 Similarly, in Manfredi v. James C. Fettes, Inc., the 
plaintiff was injured when a bottle of Canada Dry exploded.254 He had 
purchased the bottle from the defendant package store.255 He sued the 
package store for breach of warranty and the bottling company for 
negligence.256 In upholding a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court 
simply noted that adequate notice under section 2-607 had been given 
to the package store.257 
                                                          
249 Smith v. Robershaw Controls Co., 410 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 2005). 
250 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-607(3)(a) (2010). 
251 Nugent v. Popular Mkts., Inc., 228 N.E.2d 91, 92 (Mass. 1967). 
252 Id. at 93. 
253 Id. at 94. 
254 Manfredi v. James C. Fettes, Inc., 226 N.E.2d 365, 366 (Mass. 1967). 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257 Id.; see also Ford v. Barnard, Sumner & Putnam Co., 294 N.E.2d 467, 468 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1973) (holding that where notice was insufficient when a 
plaintiff was injured by a cosmetic that she bought a defendant’s store); Sullivan 
v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 168 N.E.2d 80, 85–86 (Mass. 1960) (holding that 
where the plaintiff drank milk from a container in which there was a dead 
mouse, the statement of the plaintiff’s son to the seller’s president that the 
plaintiff had been made ill and should bring suit was sufficient notice under the 
Sales Act). 
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In none of these cases did the court discuss the question whether 
notice was required in such a case: The plaintiff was the “buyer”;258 
the defendant was the (immediate) seller;259 and the transaction was a 
“sale,” that is, “the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a 
price.”260 The cases called for a straight-forward application of the 
Code as written. 
Matters become complicated when the warranty claimant is not a 
buyer, or at least not a buyer from the defendant. Matters become even 
more complicated in Massachusetts because of the notice provision in 
section 2-318. 
Although one occasionally comes across statements in the cases to 
the effect that section 2-318 imposes a notice requirement,261 that is 
not actually true. The notice requirement is found in section 2-
607(3)(a).262 Section 2-318 mitigates the potential harshness of the all-
or-nothing rule of section 2-607(3)(a). To paraphrase what the SJC has 
said about another aspect of section 2-318, the plaintiff’s failure to 
give notice does not bar recovery unless the defendant proves that he 
was prejudiced by the failure. The fact that a prejudicial failure to give 
notice is a defense sheds no light on the logically prior question 
whether the plaintiff was required to give notice in the first place.263 
                                                          
258 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-103(1)(a) (2010) (“‘Buyer’ means a person who 
buys or contracts to buy goods.”). 
259 Id. § 2-103(1)(d) (“‘Seller’ means a person who sells or contracts to sell 
goods.”). 
260 Id. §2-106(1). 
261 New London County Ins. Co. v. Broan Nutone, LLC, No. BACV20020130, 
2006 WL 2221838 (Mass. Super. Ct., July 3, 2006) (timely notice required by 
§ 2-318) (citation omitted); Cameo Curtains, Inc. v. Philip Carey Corp., 416 
N.E.2d 995, 998 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (stating “[b]ecause of the express 
provision concerning notice in [§] 2-318, there is no occasion to consider the 
applicability of [M.]G.L. c. 106, [§] 2-607(3)(a).”). 
262 Smith v. Robershaw Controls Co., 410 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Because of 
its UCC origins, warranty liability in Massachusetts contains certain technical 
requirements not found in strict tort liability. One such requirement is prompt 
notice. Under Massachusetts law, ‘the buyer must within a reasonable time after 
he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or 
be barred or be barred from any remedy.’” (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, 
§ 2-607(a)(3))). 
263 Mason v. General Motors Corp., 490 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Mass. 1986) (“It is true, 
of course, that under [M.]G.L. c. 106, § 2-318, lack of privity between a plaintiff 
and a defendant is not a defense to a claim for breach of an implied warranty of 
merchantability. But, the fact that lack of privity is not a defense to a breach of 
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“Buyer” is a defined term: “a person who buys or contracts to buy 
goods.”264 A “buyer,”265 obviously, must notify the seller266 of a 
claimed breach. With the abolition of the privity requirement by 
section 2-318, however, warranties run to persons other than buyers. 
They run to “a person whom the manufacturer, seller, lessor or 
supplier might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be 
affected by the goods.”267 Such a person could be a “buyer.” He could 
also be a “purchaser,”268 or simply a bystander. 
There are several cases, none of them decided by the SJC, in which 
the prejudicial effect of a non-buyer’s failure to comply with the notice 
requirement was the issue.269 In all of these cases, the injured plaintiff 
was not the buyer of the product.270 The question was not raised 
whether the plaintiff was required to give notice in the first place.271 
                                                                                                                                         
warranty claim sheds no light on the logically prior question whether a warranty 
has indeed been made.”). 
264 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-103(1)(a) (2010). 
265 Hebron v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., 60 F.3d 1095, 1097-98 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that under Va. Law, the notice requirement applied to all “buyers,” 
including retail consumers). 
266 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-103(1)(a). 
267 Id. § 2-318. 
268 Id. § 1-201(33) (2010) (“‘Purchaser’ means a person or his nominee who takes 
by purchase.”); see also id. (32) (defining purchase as “taking by sale, discount, 
negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, issue or re-issue, gift or 
any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property”). 
269 The SJC, upon occasion, makes general statements in dictum about the notice 
requirement. See e.g., Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 275 n. 2 (Mass. 
1984) (“Of course, the defendant might not be liable even though a breach of 
warranty is established. A failure to give timely notice of breach of warranty, if 
prejudicial to the defendant constitutes a defense.” (citing M.G.L. c. 106, §§ 2-
318, 2-607 (3)(a))); Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Mass. 
1978) (“In 1973, the section was extended to lessors, and the defense of failure 
to give notice was limited to cases where the defendant proved prejudice.”). 
270 See Castro v. Stanley Works, 864 F.2d 961, 962 (1st Cir. 1989) (plaintiff injured 
by product in the course of employment); Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc., 106 F.3d 444 (1st Cir. 1997) (service station manager); Henrick v. Coats 
Co., 458 N.E.2d 773 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (service station employee); see also 
Smith v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 410 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2005) (where the 
plaintiff who was burned while attempting to light a propane water heater in his 
basement may or may not have been the actual buyer of the product). 
271 This usually occurs because the parties concede that the law requires notice. See 
Sacramona, 106 F.3d at 448 (“[n]either side disputes that Massachusetts law 
embodies a notice requirement for warranty claims”). 
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The only Massachusetts case that has directly addressed the 
question whether a non-buyer warranty beneficiary is required to give 
notice is an early decision of the Appellate Division, Menard v. Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.272 A mother bought a can of tuna at the 
defendant’s supermarket.273 She and her minor son were injured by a 
foreign object in the fish.274 The plaintiffs’ attorney sent a notice to the 
defendant, but the notice was held legally insufficient to satisfy section 
2-607(3)(a).275 The mother’s claim therefore failed because she—the 
buyer—had not given proper notice, “a condition precedent to 
establishing the defendant’s liability in her case.”276 Not so the son’s 
case. 
The son, who was in the family of the buyer and suffered personal 
injury because of the breach of warranty, was a beneficiary of the 
warranty.277 The court held that he, as a third-party beneficiary of the 
warranty, was not bound by the notice provisions of section 2-
607(3)(a): 
No case law on the question of the type of notice, if any, 
required of third party beneficiaries has developed as of now. We 
do not think it was intended to make the rights of this large group, 
to whom the warranty has been extended, dependent upon notice 
being given by the buyer. Experience tells us that there will be 
instances in which an alleged breach of warranty will cause injury 
only to third parties. 
Neither do we feel that one in this group is required to 
personally notify the seller of the alleged breach. It might be 
                                                          
272 Menard v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 22 Mass. App. Dec. 170 (1961). Menard 
was apparently the first case in the country to construe § 2-607(3)(a). 
273 Id. at 170. 
274 Id. 
275 Id. at 174–75 (“The notice in the present case does not assert, and it cannot be 
inferred, a sale of the tuna fish was made by the defendant. The date, or 
approximate date, of purchase is not given . . . . It does not ‘indicate that the 
claim arose out of the sale.’ Reference in the notice to ‘your product’ and 
‘negligence’ is confusing, making it uncertain whether the plaintiff sought to 
hold the defendant liable as a manufacturer or seller.”). The Appellate Division 
in Barry v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 37 Mass. App. Dec. 213, 215 n.2 (1967), stated 
that this holding was probably overruled by Nugent v. Popular Markets, Inc., 
228 N.E.2d 91 (Mass. 1967) (holding that the UCC notice requirement was less 
rigorous than under the Sales Act). 
276 Menard, 22 Mass. App. Dec. at 173 (citing Burns v. Jordan Marsh Co., 26 N.E. 
368, 373 (Mass. 1940)). 
277 Id. at 175 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (1960)). 
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difficult, if not impossible, in some circumstances, for a third party 
to give a notice concerning the details of a sale. To hold otherwise 
would require our reading into § 2-607(3)(a) that notice, now 
required only of the buyer, be given by anyone claiming an 
extended warranty, under § 2-318 (emphasis supplied). The 
provisions of this code received the attention in its drafting of 
eminent legal authorities, and if it was so intended it could have 
been readily stated. We cannot read it into the statute. The son’s 
minority is immaterial. That the result reached here seems to be 
incongruous is the concern of the legislature.278 
Menard is the only Massachusetts case that has expressly 
considered the question whether a warranty beneficiary, who was not a 
buyer, is required to give notice as a condition of recovering for a 
breach of warranty.279 The case law on the issue, whose absence was 
noted by the court,280 has developed in other jurisdictions and the great 
weight of authority in other states has aligned with the conclusion 
reached by the Menard court.281 
 In Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, perhaps the leading case on this 
point, the Carta family bought a bicycle for their minor daughter.282 
The bicycle was manufactured by the defendant, Union Cycle Co., and 
sold to the general public through the manufacturer’s dealer, also a 
                                                          
278 Id. at 175–76. 
279 There are a few Massachusetts cases involving non-buyer plaintiffs in which the 
court discussed the notice requirement. In none of these cases, as far as appears, 
did the court or the parties raise the issue whether notice was actually required to 
be given. But see Olsen v. BBRG Mass. Rest., Inc., 2005 Mass. App. Div. 23, 
2005 WL 552365, in which the plaintiff brought a warranty claim after breaking 
two teeth on a metal item in french fries ordered at the defendant’s restaurant. In 
discussing the notice issue, the court stated, “It is not entirely clear that the 
notice requirement in [M.]G.L. c. 106, § 2-607(3)(a), which seems to address 
breach of contract issues in the context of shipping and receiving goods, would 
apply in the context of a consumer’s purchase of a prepared meal in a 
restaurant.” 2005 WL 552365, at *2. The court’s dictum highlights the problem 
of using warranty law as the basis of strict product liability. A literal reading of 
the statutory language shows that the plaintiff was required to give notice to his 
seller. Section 2-314(1) specifically says that “the serving for value of food or 
drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.” The 
plaintiff and the restaurant were a “buyer” and a “seller” within the meaning of 
section 2-103(1)(a), (d). 
280 Menard, 22 Mass. App. Dec. at 175. 
281 See, e.g., Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 217 A.2d 71, 74 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1965). 
282 Id.at 71–72. 
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defendant.283 Sandra Tomczuk, while a guest at the Carta home, was 
injured when she was thrown from the bicycle due to certain alleged 
defects in it.284 Two of the counts in the complaint were for breach of 
express and implied warranties by the manufacturer.285 Union Cycle 
demurred to these counts on the ground that it had not been given 
notice of the claimed breach.286 
The manufacturer made a two-step argument. It argued first that 
the definition of “seller”287 is not limited to the retailer or immediate 
vendor, but included a manufacturer that sold the product to the 
retailer.288 It argued second, 
[S]ince the plaintiffs seek to impose on it all the duties imposed by 
the Uniform Commercial Code on sellers, it is only reasonable that 
Union Cycle be given the notice rights of a seller, since the 
underlying theory of notice is to give the defendant an opportunity 
to inspect allegedly defective goods so that he can assess his 
liability.289 
The court rejected the first argument based on the plain language 
of the statute.290 The plaintiff was not a “buyer.” Second, no “sale”291 
took place between Union Cycle and the Cartas.292 
It cannot be said that a ‘sale’ was made by Union Cycle to the 
Cartas. It is not disputed that the bicycle was sold by Union Cycle 
to [the retailer]. Thus, title passed from the former as seller to the 
latter as buyer, and when [the retailer] sold to the Cartas, once 
again title was passed by [the retailer] as the seller to the Cartas as 
the buyer. Section [2-313] speaks of certain conduct ‘by the seller 
to the buyer.’ Section [2-315] embodies reference to ‘the seller’ 
and to ‘the buyer . . . relying on the seller’s skill or judgment.’ The 
legislature intended to make a distinction between the 
manufacturer as a seller to a retailer as buyer and the retailer as a 
seller to the public as buyer, for in § [2-607(5)] it is provided that 
                                                          




287 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d) (2011) (“[A] person who sells or contracts to sell goods.”). 
288 Tomczuk , 217 A.2d at 72. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 73. 
291 U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2011) (“A ‘sale’ consists in the passing of title from the 
seller to the buyer for a price . . . .”). 
292 Tomczuk , 217 A.2d at 73. 
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‘where the buyer is sued for a breach of a warranty . . . he may 
give his seller written notice of the litigation.’ The term ‘his seller’ 
obviously refers to the person who made the immediate sale to one 
who is his buyer.293 
There was nothing to indicate a legislative intent to require non-
buyer warranty beneficiaries to give notice under section 2-607(3)(a) 
as a condition of recovery.294 
The plaintiff in Frericks v. General Motors Corp. was a passenger 
in an automobile.295 He was injured when the driver (the son of the 
buyers) fell asleep and lost control of the car.296 He and his father 
brought an action against the manufacturer and the dealer, based on an 
alleged design defect in the locking mechanism of the seat in which he 
was riding which enhanced the injuries he received in the accident.297 
The plaintiffs’ claims included one for breach of warranty against both 
defendants.298 The trial court held that a third-party beneficiary of 
warranties should be treated as a buyer for purposes of section 2-
607(3)(a) and therefore granted summary judgment to the defendants 
on the warranty counts because the plaintiffs had not given notice to 
the defendants until they brought suit.299 
On appeal, the court held that a third-party beneficiary of a 
warranty was not required by section 2-607 to notify the seller of a 
breach of warranty.300 Section 2-607 is limited to actual buyers, as 
defined in section 2-103(1)(a).301 “We are not free, in view of the 
unambiguous language of § 2-607 requiring only the buyer to notify 
the seller of breach, and the definition of buyer in § 2-103, to extend 
that requirement to encompass the plaintiffs here.”302 
                                                          
293 Id. 
294 Id. at 73–74. 
295 Frericks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 460, 460–61 (Md. 1976). 
296 Id. at 461. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. at 462 
300 Id. at 463. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at 465. 
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The great majority of courts that have considered the issue agree 
with these decisions.303 There are courts that hold otherwise.304 
In Lariviere v. Dayton Safety Ladder Co., a worker—a non-buyer 
warranty beneficiary—who was injured by a ladder brought warranty 
and various other claims against the manufacturer.305 The plaintiff had 
given notice to the manufacturer and the issue was the sufficiency of 
that notice.306 In that context, the Rhode Island court noted in passing 
that: 
plaintiff is not a merchant, nor is he a retail buyer. Rather, he is 
properly considered a “beneficiary” of the warranty. Comment 5 to 
§ 6A-2-607 suggests that a beneficiary is required to give notice 
only that an injury has occurred and that the beneficiary should be 
held to the requirement of good faith.307 
Under Illinois law, non-buyer warranty beneficiaries are subject to 
the notice requirement.308 
                                                          
303 WILLISTON, supra note 227(stating that generally the ultimate buyer does not 
have to provide notice because there is no privity between the ultimate buyer 
and the seller that made the warranty); e.g., Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 368 A.2d 993, 
996-97 (Md. 1977) (holding that requiring the plaintiff employee to give notice 
to the seller because the plaintiff’s employer was the buyer); Chaffin v. Atlanta 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 194 S.E.2d 513, 515 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that 
the notice provision was not applicable to the plaintiff injured by a foreign 
substance in a soft drink who was a third-party beneficiary of the supermarket’s 
warranty); Cole v. Keller Indus., Inc., 132 F.3d 1044, 1048 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(deciding that an employee injured while using a ladder purchased by the 
employer was considered a non-purchaser and not required to give notice as a 
condition precedent to a warranty claim for personal injury); Simmons v. 
Clemco Indus., 368 So.2d 509, 513–14 (Ala. 1979) (holding that employees 
injured by a another employee were not required to give notice). 
304 See, e.g., Lariviere v. Dayton Safety Ladder Co., 525 A.2d 892, 898 (R.I. 1987). 
305 Id. at 893. 
306 Id. at 897–98. 
307 Id. at 898 (footnote omitted). 
308 Ratkovich v. Smithkline, 711 F. Supp. 436, 438 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (stating that the 
requirement of notice extends to non-buyer beneficiaries); Maldonado v. 
Creative Woodworking Concepts, Inc., 694 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1998) (stating that the notice requirement applies to all warranty beneficiaries); 
In re McDonald’s French Fries Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 953, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2007) 
(stating that by filing the lawsuit against the seller will serve as an exception to 
direct notice). 
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The related issue is whether a buyer is required to give notice to a 
remote seller. The great weight of authority is that notice is not 
required to be given to a remote seller.309 
In Massachusetts and the few other jurisdictions that do not 
recognize strict product liability, the notice requirement does not 
necessarily apply. Under Virginia law, only “buyers,” as defined in the 
Code, are required to give notice while non-buyers are not required to 
give notice to the manufacturer.310 Under the North Carolina product 
liability act, there is no strict liability, and warranty actions are 
included under the rubric of “product liability action[s].”311 In Halprin 
v. Ford Motor Co., the court discussed, but did not decide the question 
whether notice of breach had to be given to a remote seller. 312 There is 
some authority that the notice requirement applies to non-privity 
plaintiffs.313 
The Delaware court, in Cline v Prowler Industries of Maryland, 
Inc., held that the adoption of the UCC preempts the judicial adoption 
of strict product liability.314 Research has not revealed any cases in 
which the Delaware courts have been asked whether the notice 
requirement applies to a non-buyer warranty beneficiary or a remote 
                                                          
309 See generally Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Necessity that Buyer of 
Goods Give Notice of Breach of Warranty to Manufacturer under UCC § 2-607, 
Requiring Notice to Seller of Breach, 24 A.L.R. 4th 277 (1983) (discussing how 
§ 2-607 requires notice to the immediate seller and not to the remote 
manufacture); 1 JAMES J. WHITE, ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12:20 
nn. 4, 6 (6th ed. 2012); 9 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL 
COURTS § 101:66 (Robert L. Haig ed., 2012) (noting that the majority of courts 
only require that the immediate seller be given notice); 3 MODERN TORT LAW: 
LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 27:19 (2d ed., 2012) (stating that notice to the 
seller will suffice). 
310 Yates v. Pitman Mfg., Inc., 514 S.E.2d 605, 606–07 (Va. 1999); Cole v. Keller 
Inds., Inc., 132 F.3d 1044, 1047–48 (4th Cir. 1998). 
311 N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 99B-1(3), 99B-1.1 (2010). 
312 Halprin v. Ford Motor Co., 420 S.E.2d 686, 688–89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). 
313 See Horne v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 541 F. Supp. 2d 768, 786–87 (W.D.N.C. 
2008) (assuming that the requirement applied and holding that it was a jury 
question whether the filing of the action could constitute seasonable notice); cf. 
Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 273 S.E.2d 681, 685 (N.C. 1981) (stating a three-
year delay by the buyer in notifying the seller until suit filed is not unreasonable 
as a matter of law). 
314 Cline v. Prowler Inds. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 980 (Del. 1980). 
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seller, although there are some passages in the Cline case that indicate 
the notice requirement would be applied in cases of this sort.315 
One question that has divided the courts in this area is Official 
Comment 5 to UCC section 2-607: 
Under this Article various beneficiaries are given rights for injuries 
sustained by them because of the seller’s breach of warranty. Such 
a beneficiary does not fall within the reason of the present section 
in regard to discovery of defects and the giving of notice within a 
reasonable time after acceptance, since he has nothing to do with 
acceptance. However, the reason of this section does extend to 
requiring the beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has 
occurred. What is said above, with regard to the extended time for 
reasonable notification from the lay consumer after the injury is 
also applicable here; but even a beneficiary can be properly held to 
the use of good faith in notifying, once he has had time to become 
aware of the legal situation.316 
Some courts have relied on Comment 5 to impose the notice 
requirement in non-privity cases.317 The majority of courts, however, 
have not followed the comment in third-party beneficiary cases.318 
These courts rely on the plain language of the statute itself, although 
they are certainly influenced by the underlying policy considerations 
that are in play.319 
                                                          
315 Id. at 974, 976–77. 
316 U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 5 (2011). 
317 E.g., Lariviere v. Dayton Safety Ladder Co., 525 A.2d 892, 898 (R.I. 1987); 
Ratkovich v. Smithkline, 711 F. Supp. 436, 438 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Collins v. 
Pfizer, Inc., No. 1:08–cv–0888–DFH–JMS, 2009 WL 126913, at *3 (S.D. Ind. 
Jan. 20, 2009); U.S. Tire-Tech, Inc. v. Boeran, B.V., 110 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex. 
App. 2003); Alvarado v. Conmed Corp., No. EP–06–CV–0198–KC, 2008 WL 
2783510, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2008). 
318 E.g., Simmons v. Clemco Inds., 368 So.2d 509, 514 (Ala. 1979); Cole v. Keller 
Inds., Inc., 132 F.3d 1044, 1048 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying Virginia law); Taylor 
v. American Honda Motor Co., 555 F. Supp. 59, 64 n.7 (M.D. Fla. 1983); 
Frericks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 460, 464 (Md. 1976); McKnelly v. 
Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1107 n.9 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Iowa law). 
319 Sean Michael Hannaway, Note, The Jurisprudence and Judicial Treatment of 
the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 962, 979 
(1990) (“Based on the principle of liberal construction in accordance with 
purpose, a reasonable construction of the buyer notification requirement could 
include third-party warranty beneficiaries. While some commentators have 
supported comment 5’s argument that the policies underlying the section apply 
to third-party beneficiaries as well as buyers, courts consistently have held to the 
contrary. They usually justify ignoring the comment’s suggestion in terms of 
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Massachusetts is the only state whose legislature has addressed the 
notice issue in non-privity cases.320 “Failure to give notice shall not bar 
recovery under this section unless the defendant proves that he was 
prejudiced thereby.”321 
[T]he action taken by the Massachusetts legislature suggests that it 
perceived a need to act in an explicit manner to exempt nonprivity 
parties from the notice requirement. One could infer that in the 
absence of language speaking to the issue, the legislature believed 
that the statute and comments required notice.322 
One could draw that inference, and perhaps that is the inference 
implicitly drawn by the courts that have imposed a notice requirement 
on third-party warranty beneficiaries. That is not, however, the only 
inference that can be drawn. The notice provision of section 2-318 
should be construed to apply only to “buyers,” not to non-buyer 
warranty beneficiaries. In section 2-318, the legislature was modifying 
the obligation that section 2-607 imposes on buyers. Under section 2-
318, the lack of privity would no longer be a bar to suit by a buyer. 
If, by the product liability amendments, the legislature was 
intending to preempt the field in the product liability area and to 
provide a remedy that was the substantial equivalent of strict tort 
liability, it is strange that the legislature would have imposed the 
notice requirement, a contract matter, on a plaintiff who was not a 
party to that contract. Buyers, under the plain language of section 2-
607, are under an obligation to notify sellers of the breach of 
warranty.323 
A seller’s warranty, under the original version of section 2-318, 
extended 
to any natural person who is in the family or household of his 
buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that 
                                                                                                                                         
proper statutory construction: if the statute meant to include both buyers and 
third-party beneficiaries it would have said so. A more principled explanation of 
judicial disregard of the comment’s suggestion is that extrinsic and independent 
policy considerations require a narrower reading.” (footnotes omitted)). 
320 Prince, supra note 235, at 152-53, 166–67. 
321 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (2010) (emphasis added). 
322 Prince, supra note 235, at 167. 
323 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-607(3)(a) (2010). 
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such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and 
who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.324 
In the 1971 amendment, the legislature rewrote the section 
abolishing privity as a defense 
in any action brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or 
supplier of goods to recover damages for breach of warranty, 
express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not 
purchase the goods from the defendant if the plaintiff was a person 
whom the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier might reasonably 
have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.325 
The notice provision in section 2-318 was added in 1973.326 
These new warranty beneficiaries were not required to give notice 
under section 2-607. Writing in 1976, three years after the notice 
provision was inserted into section 2-318, the Maryland court 
observed: “[The defendants] have cited no case, nor have we found 
any case, in which the word ‘buyer’ has been extended to encompass 
third party beneficiaries for the purposes of section 2-607 as the 
defendants now urge.”327 
A buyer bringing a tort-warranty claim against his immediate seller 
is unquestionably bound by the notice provision of section 2-607. If 
the legislative intent was that section 2-318 apply to all tort-warranty 
claims, including those by a buyer against his immediate seller for 
personal injury or property damage, the legislature may very well have 
inserted the notice provision into section 2-318 because that buyer, 
unlike a third-party warranty beneficiary, clearly is required to give 
notice under section 2-607. 
A buyer might, in fact, be required to notify a remote seller under 
section 2-607. That is certainly a plausible interpretation of the 
                                                          
324 An Act Establishing the Uniform Commercial Code, ch. 765, sec. 1, 1957 Mass. 
Acts 764, 786 (1957). 
325 An Act Providing that Lack of Privity of Contract Shall Not be a Defense in an 
Action for Breach of Warranty or Negligence Brought Against a Manufacturer 
or Seller of Goods, ch. 670, sec. 1, 1971 Mass. Acts 497 (1971). 
326 An Act Providing that Lack of Privity of Contract Shall Not be a Defense in 
Actions for Breach of Warranty or Negligence Brought Against a Lessor of 
Goods and Establishing a Statute of Limitations for the Commencement of such 
Actions, ch. 750, sec. 1, 1973 Mass. Acts 739, 739–40 (1973). 
327 Frericks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 460, 465 (Md. 1976). 
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statute,328 even though many courts disagree.329 If a buyer is injured by 
a remote seller’s product, or if, as the Jacobs court held, section 2-318 
is intended to apply to a consumer buyer bringing a contract-warranty 
claim against a remote seller,330 and if the legislature did believe that 
section 2-607 required notice to a remote seller, it would explain the 
addition of a notice provision to section 2-318. 
The notice provision of section 2-318 should be construed to apply 
only to buyers, who fall within the terms of section 2-607, and not to 
impose a new requirement—a contract-based requirement—on those 
to whom the warranty extends as a matter of public policy. 
3. Should Notice Be Required in Product Liability Cases? 
Controversies between “town and gown” are notorious. There is a 
similar controversy, this time between judicial robe and academic 
gown, on the question whether the notice requirement of section 2-607 
should be applied in product liability cases. Many commentators argue 
for the imposition of the notice requirement in non-privity cases, even 
those involving personal injury.331 On the other hand, the great weight 
of judicial authority does not impose a notice requirement on third-
party warranty beneficiaries.332 
a. The Notice Requirement and Product Liability Cases 
Whatever the uncertainties of interpretation with regard to non-
privity plaintiffs, the Code itself is quite clear that a buyer must give 
                                                          
328 See Fred H. Miller, The Crossroads: The Case for the Code in Products 
Liability, 21 OKLA. L. REV. 411, 434 n.83 (1968) (“[Comment 5] does not deal, 
however, with the case of a consumer-buyer suing the manufacturer. It does not 
because the drafters of § 2-607(3)(a) no doubt contemplated that § 2-607(3)(a) 
itself covered this case as where the buyer sues his immediate seller.”). 
329 See, e.g., Frericks, 363 A.2d at 464–45. 
330 See e.g., Kolarik v. Cory Int’l Corp., 721 N.W.2d 159, 163 n. 3 (Iowa 2006) 
(construing Iowa’s version of § 2-318 and distinguishing between “extended 
beneficiaries” of warranties, who are not required to give notice under § 2-607, 
and remote buyers seeking economic-loss damages, who must be in privity with 
the warrantor). 
331 See, e.g., Prince, supra note 235, at 168; Arlie R. Nogay, Comment, Enforcing 
the Rights of Remote Sellers under the UCC: Warranty Disclaimers, the Implied 
Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose and the Notice Requirement in the 
Nonprivity Context, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 873, 902 (1986); WHITE ET AL., supra 
note 309, at § 12:20; Richard C. Ausness, Replacing Strict Liability with a 
Contract-Based Products Liability Regime, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 171, 212 (1998). 
332 See supra Part III.C.2. 
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notice to his immediate seller.333 In most jurisdictions, an injured 
plaintiff is not required to give formal notice as a condition of 
recovering for his injury. Notice is not required in a product liability 
case based on strict tort liability or negligence.334 A plaintiff whose 
warranty claim fails because of a prejudicial failure to give notice may 
still recover in negligence for the same injury.335 
Two states have amended their versions of section 2-607 to abolish 
the notice requirement in personal injury cases.336 The Maine statute 
states in relevant part: 
(3) Where a tender has been accepted, 
(a) The buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or 
should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be 
barred from any remedy; and 
. . . . 
(7) Subsection (3), paragraph (a) shall not apply where the remedy 
is for personal injury resulting from any breach.337 
The South Carolina version of section 2-607(3)(a) states: 
(3) Where a tender has been accepted 
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or 
should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be 
                                                          
333 U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (2011). 
334 See supra notes 221–222 and accompanying text. 
335 E.g. Castro v. Stanley Works, 864 F.2d 961, 963–64 (1989) (plaintiff recovered 
on negligence claim; warranty claim was barred by unreasonable delay in giving 
notice). It has actually been mooted whether the intent of the Code is to require 
notice as a condition of recovery on any theory. Jerry J. Phillips, Notice of 
Breach in Sales and Strict Tort Liability Law: Should There Be a Difference?, 
47 IND. L.J. 457, 462 (1972). Phillips cites Nelson v. Boulay Bros. Co., a case in 
which the failure of a warranty claim under the Sales Act because of lack of 
timely notice did not preclude a negligence claim. 135 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Wis. 
1965) (“The instant action arose before the effective date of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. We note, however, that there is broad language in the new 
[§2-607(3)(a)], which would suggest that a buyer who fails to give notice is 
‘barred from any remedy.’ We are not called upon to determine whether a 
different conclusion would result from the new legislation.”). 
336 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-607(7) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-
607(3)(a) (2012). 
337 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-607(3)(a), (7) (2012). 
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barred from any remedy; however, no notice of injury to the person 
in the case of consumer goods shall be required . . . .338 
The Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC disapproved the South 
Carolina amendment stating, as its “Reason for Rejection,” that “[t]he 
amendment to subsection (3)(a) may have merit, since notice may be 
dispensed with by classifying the liability as strict liability in tort. But 
it seems unnecessary if ‘reasonable time’ is read as suggested in 
Comment 4.”339 
The Editorial Board’s Comment is an example of one of the 
frequent arguments made by proponents of requiring notice in non-
privity personal injury cases: the availability of the alternative remedy 
of strict tort liability, which does not impose a notice requirement.340 
The argument is also made that satisfying the notice requirement is 
part and parcel of a remedy under the Code. As on judge has stated: 
[T]he majority of this court recognized the existence of two 
separate remedies, one, strict liability in tort, and the other, implied 
warranty, provided by the Uniform Commercial Code. When the 
Uniform Commercial Code remedy is sought it logically should be 
accompanied by both the benefits and the detriments expressly 
provided by the statute.341 
In a similar vein, another commentator has stated: 
Present-day courts, however, should recognize the differences 
between the two existing causes of action, and not allow the 
confluence to result in the slighting of the statutory requirement of 
notice of breach in accepted goods when a contract cause of action 
is advanced. If the consumer seeks to recover a remedy from a 
seller as a remote vendee in an action for breach of contract, then 
                                                          
338 S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-607(3)(a) (2012). 
339 AMERICAN LAW INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 
REPORT NO. 3 OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 48 (1967); U.C.C. § 2-607, cmt. 4 (“The time of 
notification is to be determined by applying commercial standards to a merchant 
buyer. ‘A reasonable time’ for notification from a retail consumer is to be 
judged by different standards so that in his case it will be extended, for the rule 
of requiring notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to 
deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy.”). 
340 WHITE ET AL., supra note 309, at § 12:19 n. 12 (“[M]ost plaintiffs seeking 
recovery for personal injury will invoke a theory of strict tort liability; hence 
recovery is not conditioned on the buyer notifying the seller of defect.”). 
341 Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 512 P.2d 776, 781 (Or. 1973) (Denecke, J., 
concurring). 
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the buyer must satisfy the requisites of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, including the giving of reasonable notice of breach in 
accepted goods.342 
The idea that an action under the Code is a package deal is a 
reasonable one. A plaintiff who chooses to sue under the Code must 
take the good with the bad. That is the problem. In Massachusetts, 
unlike most other States, plaintiffs do not have a choice: If they wish 
to pursue a “strict liability” product claim, they must proceed under the 
UCC with its notice requirement. In a great many cases, of course, 
notice will not be a problem. But the fact remains that plaintiffs who 
might otherwise have a viable case can lose because of the notice 
requirement. 
Section 2-607, the Code’s notice provision, is presently applicable 
to ordinary consumers. . . . [M]ost courts have relaxed notice 
requirements significantly in personal injury cases involving retail 
purchasers. Moreover, accident victims normally obtain legal 
assistance immediately upon injury and lawyers are generally 
familiar with the Code’s notice provisions even if consumers are 
not. Thus, legitimate claims will seldom be barred because 
unwitting consumers fail to comply with the requirements of 
section 2-607. 
Even so, it might be better to scrap the notice requirement in 
consumer-related cases that involve either personal injury or 
property damage. To be sure, the notice requirement is useful in 
commercial transactions. However, in other cases, the notice 
requirement does little more than alert the seller to the fact that a 
demand for compensation will shortly be forthcoming. 
Consequently, the notice requirement appears to serve no useful 
purpose in such cases and probably ought to be dispensed with.343 
The prejudice requirement in section 2-318 can obviate some of 
the problem. As it has been interpreted in case law, however, it is not 
always fair to the plaintiff. “The question is simply whether the 
defendant was prejudiced by the lost evidence, not whether the 
plaintiff was also prejudiced, or who was prejudiced more, or whether 
the plaintiff (as opposed to some third party) was responsible for the 
                                                          
342 Prince, supra note 235, at 150 (discussing the judicial confusion in the non-
privity notice cases between contract warranty and strict products liability and 
arguing that the two causes of action are distinct and that the notice requirement 
should be applied in warranty cases under the Code). 
343 Ausness, supra note 331, at 212. 
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loss.”344 That is inequitable. If evidence is lost, both parties should be 
treated in the same way. The loss of evidence should not result in an 
automatic win for the defendant. 
A prejudicial failure to give notice will bar the warranty claim.345 
But it will have no effect on a negligence claim or a chapter 93A claim 
based on the same facts. A plaintiff can lose on the warranty claim but 
still recover on a negligence claim.346 If the notice defense prevails in 
a warranty action, however, it is an all-or-nothing proposition. The 
plaintiff is simply “barred from any remedy”347 under the Code, 
regardless of whether the plaintiff was also prejudiced or was even 
responsible for the loss of potential evidence. 
b. Spoliation: A Better Alternative 
The source of prejudice identified in the case law under section 2-
318 is the loss of potential evidence.348 The loss of evidence, however, 
can be as prejudicial to the plaintiff as it is to the defendant. The 
legitimate interests of both the plaintiff and the defendant could be 
protected by the doctrine of spoliation: A plaintiff who has negligently 
or intentionally caused the loss or destruction of evidence is subject to 
sanctions up to and including, in a proper case, the dismissal of the 
action.349 The remedy for spoliation is “carefully tailored to remedy 
the precise unfairness occasioned by that spoliation. A party’s claim of 
prejudice stemming from spoliation is addressed within the context of 
the action that was allegedly affected by that spoliation.”350 
The doctrine of spoliation allows for a more nuanced balancing of 
the interests of both parties than does the prejudice requirement of 
section 2-318. The court has wide discretion in imposing sanctions for 
the spoliation of evidence. Those sanctions can include a dismissal of 
the case, although that ultimate sanction is not favored.351 
                                                          
344 Smith v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 410 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 2005). 
345 Swartz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Mass. 1978). 
346 E.g., Castro v. Stanley Works, 864 F.2d 961, 963–64 (1st Cir. 1989). 
347 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-607(3)(a) (2010). 
348 Castro, 864 F.2d at 964 (citing Morales v. National Grange Mutual Ins. Co., 423 
A.2d 325, 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980)). 
349 Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 773 N.E.2d 420, 427–28 (Mass. 2002). 
350 Id. at 426. 
351 9 JOSEPH R. NOLAN & BRUCE HENRY, CIVIL PRACTICE § 26.6 (3d ed. 2011). 
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The doctrine of spoliation would apply to all theories used by the 
plaintiff: breach of warranty, negligence, and violation of chapter 93A. 
If the plaintiff had intentionally or negligently lost or destroyed the 
evidence or if the evidence had been lost or destroyed by a person for 
whose conduct the plaintiff is not responsible, the result would be the 
same across the board. The sanction, if the court were to impose one, 
would apply to the warranty claim as well as to the negligence 
claim.352 If the sanction were something less than the dismissal of a 
negligence claim, the warranty claim would also not be dismissed. A 
negligence claim is unlikely to be dismissed on the ground of 
spoliation unless the destruction of the evidence was willful or 
intentional, whereas, under section 2-318, the case can be dismissed 
even if a third person were responsible for the loss of the evidence.353 
In the Sacramona case, the court had to deal with both a spoliation 
issue and a notice issue.354 The plaintiff, a service station manager, 
was injured when he tried to mount and inflate a sixteen-inch tire on a 
sixteen-and-a-half inch wheel and the tire exploded.355 The plaintiff’s 
attorney was able to obtain the tire and wheel about four months after 
the accident from the customer, who had removed them and left them 
unprotected in his yard.356 About five months later, the attorney gave 
the tire and wheel to a consulting engineer, who ultimately gave them 
to the plaintiff’s liability expert about two and a half years after that.357 
In the meantime, with one day left on the statute of limitations, the 
plaintiff brought suit for both negligence and breach of warranty.358 At 
the time suit was filed, the service station had been sold and many 
relevant evidentiary area items were gone.359 In addition, the wheel 
                                                          
352 See Public Serv. Mut. Ins. v. Empire Comfort Syss., Inc., 573 F. Supp.2d 372, 
381 n.13 (D. Mass. 2008) (discussing, but not reaching, the spoliation issue 
because warranties were not established). 
353 Kippenhan v. Chaulk Servs., Inc., 697 N.E.2d 527, 530 (Mass. 1998) (“The rule 
excluding evidence as a remedy for spoliation is based on both the unfair 
prejudice that would otherwise result and the fact of a negligent or intentional 
destruction of physical evidence. Spoliation, therefore, does not include a fault-
free destruction or loss of physical evidence.”). 
354 Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 446 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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had been subjected to a “‘somewhat destructive’ examination” by the 
consulting engineer and an “extensive cleaning” by the liability expert, 
all of which made it impossible to check the markings on the inside of 
the wheel that might have been relevant to the plaintiff’s theory of the 
case.360 
The court, on the warranty question, held that the defendant had 
been prejudiced by the loss of evidence and thus the warranty claim 
was barred by section 2-318.361 The district court had granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the negligence claim 
because, with the exclusion of the wheel as evidence as a sanction for 
the spoliation, the plaintiff would not have been able to prove his 
case.362 The court on appeal indicated that a dismissal was 
disproportionate to the prejudice suffered by the defendant.363 It 
upheld the judgment, however, because the plaintiff’s conduct was 
“patent negligence,” and his negligence claim would still fail even if a 
more limited sanction were imposed.364 
The product involved in the Chapman case was a daybed.365 The 
plaintiff’s 15-month-old son was found dead, wedged between the 
mattress and the side rail of the bed.366 The bed itself was broken up 
and taken to the dump by the boy’s father and uncle shortly after the 
accident, literally, in fact, before the boy was in his grave.367 
About six months later, the plaintiff bought another bed, which 
was purportedly the same model as the one that had been destroyed.368 
The plaintiff brought suit on several theories, including negligence and 
                                                          
360 Id. at 445–46. 
361 Id. at 448–50. 
362 Id. at 448. 
363 Id. 
364 Id. (“Under Massachusetts law, contributory negligence by the victim is a bar to 
any recovery if it represents more than 50 percent of the total negligence on both 
sides. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 85. Whether or not the wheel or tire might 
have been more safely designed, it would be patent negligence by the plaintiff to 
select a 16-inch tire as a replacement without some good reason to think that the 
wheel was also 16 inches.”). 
365 Chapman ex rel. Estate of Chapman v. Bernard’s Inc., 167 F. Supp.2d 406, 410 
(D. Mass. 2001). 
366 Id. at 411. 
367 Id. 
368 Id. 
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breach of warranty,369 and the defendant moved for summary 
judgment on several grounds, including spoliation and lack of proper 
notice.370 
The court denied the motion for summary judgment due to 
spoliation.371 Although the defendant had suffered “substantial 
prejudice,” the degree of prejudice did not warrant excluding evidence 
(e.g., the police photographs of the original bed, expert reports based 
on examinations of the pictures) from the case.372 The absence of the 
actual daybed made it more difficult to prove various things (e.g., 
whether the actual bed had been abused by the boy’s mother), but 
there was other evidence that the jury could consider which might 
offset any prejudice.373 The court did note, however, the “strong 
possibility” that the defendant “may be entitled to a negative inference 
jury instruction at trial.”374 
The court also denied the motion for summary judgment with 
respect to the notice issue.375 There was a genuine issue of material 
fact with regard to the timeliness of the notice.376 That finding would 
have been enough to deny the motion because it is necessary to 
establish both an unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice in order to 
make out the defense.377 As noted above, the reasonableness of the 
delay is typically the much more difficult question in the analysis. 
The court did analyze the prejudice issue and concluded that here 
too there was a material issue of fact whether the defendant had been 
prejudiced by the failure to receive prompt notice.378 The bed had been 
destroyed almost immediately after the boy’s death and left out in a 
                                                          
369 Id. 
370 Id. at 413, 415. 
371 Id. at 413–14. 
372 Id. at 413. 
373 Id. at 414. 
374 Id. 
375 Id. at 415. 
376 Id. 
377 Smith v. Robershaw Controls Co., 410 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318). 
378 Chapman, 167 F. Supp.2d at 415. 
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dump for an unknown period of time.379 There was no way to know 
when notice would have been helpful to the defendant.380 
The defendant also claimed to be prejudiced because it could not 
obtain an exemplar daybed.381 The court agreed that this did present 
“potential for prejudice,” but stated that the prejudice could be cured if 
the exemplar daybed offered by the plaintiff were proven to be the 
relevant model.382 
The Chapman case illustrates the problem. There had been a 
horrendous injury, and there was a very sympathetic plaintiff. The 
court did a thoughtful and sensitive analysis of the potential prejudice 
to the defendant with regard to both the spoliation issue and under the 
notice issue and held that the defendant, at least for purposes of 
summary judgment, had not proven prejudice as a matter of law. With 
respect to the notice issue, however, it is not clear that the court was 
properly applying the test as set out in the cases. In its discussion of 
the spoliation issue, the court had, in fact, found that the defendant had 
suffered prejudice because of the destruction of the bed, but did not 
find that the degree of prejudice warranted excluding the evidence that 
was available.383 The absence of the bed made it more difficult to 
establish facts relevant to the defense. 
“But to show prejudice based on a lack of notice, the defendants 
needed only to prove that evidence was lost that might well have 
helped them, and that they have done.”384 “[T]he test is not . . . that 
formal prejudice results only from a loss of substance, but rather, that 
prejudice may result when ‘evidence which may reasonably have been 
developed by prompt investigation has been lost.’”385 
The critical difference between spoliation-prejudice and notice-
prejudice is the result of finding prejudice. If the notice defense is 
successful, if, that is to say, the notice was unreasonably delayed and 
the defendant prejudiced thereby, the defendant wins and the plaintiff 
                                                          
379 Id. 
380 Id. at 415–16. 
381 Id. at 416. 
382 Id. 
383 Id. at 413–14. 
384 Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 449 (1st Cir. 1997). 
385 Castro v. Stanley Works, 864 F.2d 961, 964 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Morales v. 
National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 423 A.2d 325, 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1980). 
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is “barred from any remedy.”386 If, on the other hand, the spoliation 
defense prevails, certain evidence may not be admitted, but that does 
not necessarily mean an automatic win for the defendant. In 
Sacramona, the finding of prejudice necessitated the dismissal of the 
warranty claim.387 The negligence claim was not dismissed because of 
spoliation of evidence; it was dismissed because the court held that the 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence barred the claim.388 The plaintiff’s 
claims should be treated consistently. 
Massachusetts should follow the lead of Maine and South Carolina 
and abolish the notice requirement in personal injury cases. It is a 
contract defense that is being used to defeat a liability that is imposed, 
not as a matter of contract law, but as a matter of public policy. It is a 
requirement that is not imposed in strict product liability cases in an 
overwhelming majority of states.389 If the main purpose of the notice 
requirement in cases such as these is to prevent prejudice to the 
defendant by reason of the loss of potential evidence, that purpose can 
be served in a way that is fair to both parties by the doctrine of 
spoliation. Spoliation would apply to all of the plaintiff’s theories 
consistently. If the prejudice resulting from the spoliation were serious 
enough to warrant the dismissal of the case, the entire case would be 
dismissed.390 If, on the other hand, the degree of prejudice were less 
than that, the plaintiff’s case would proceed on all theories, hampered 
by such sanctions as the court imposed. There would no longer be an 
automatic all-or-nothing result.391 The doctrine of spoliation 
adequately protects the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. 
It is time to defuse this “nuclear bomb” and disassemble the 
“booby-trap.”392 
                                                          
386 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-607(3)(a) (2010). 
387 Sacramona, 106 F.3d at 449. 
388 Id. 
389 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
390 NOLAN, supra note 351, at § 26.6. 
391 This is consistent with the approach taken in the 2003 version of Article 2. 
U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 2003) (“(3) If a tender has been 
accepted: (a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers 
or should have discovered any breach notify the seller, but failure to give timely 
notice bars the buyer from a remedy only to the extent that the seller is 
prejudiced by the failure . . . .” (emphasis added)). That is essentially the same 
result that would be obtained under the doctrine of spoliation. 
392 See supra notes 224 and 229 and accompanying text. 
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4. Other Notice Problems Caused by Section 2-318 
The inclusion of a notice provision in section 2-318 creates 
problems of interpretation similar to those regarding the statute of 
limitations. 
Under section 2-318, a defendant may prevail on the notice 
defense only upon a showing of prejudice.393 That is not the case under 
section 2-607. The rule of section 2-607 is absolute: A buyer who does 
not give the seller proper notice of breach will “be barred from any 
remedy.”394 No showing of prejudice is necessary. 
It seems to be established now that section 2-318 does not apply to 
commercial contract-warranty cases.395 Privity is still required in these 
cases, and a merchant buyer claiming breach of warranty must notify 
the seller in order to succeed.396 The standard applied in a case such as 
this would be the normal section 2-607 one, which does not require a 
showing of prejudice. 
Similarly, it is clear that a buyer who has suffered personal injury 
or property damage as a result of a breach of warranty by his 
immediate seller is required to give the seller notice under section 2-
607.397 Does the prejudice requirement of section 2-318 apply to a case 
like this? 
Section 2-318 says that the failure to give notice will not bar 
recovery “under this section” unless the defendant proves prejudice.398 
The case of the buyer suing the immediate seller is not, strictly 
speaking, brought “under this section.” 
The criteria for notice under section 2-607 are different for 
merchant buyers and for consumers. The official comments 
contemplate cutting the consumer some slack.399 Nevertheless, there is 
                                                          
393 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (2010). 
394 Id. § 2-607. 
395 See supra Part III.B. 
396 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-607(3)(a) (2010). 
397 See Part III.C.3. 
398 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (2010). 
399 See Nugent v. Popular Markets, Inc., 228 N.E.2d 91, 93–94 (Mass. 1967); 
U.C.C. § 2-607, cmt. 4 (2011) (“The time of notification is to be determined by 
applying commercial standards to a merchant buyer. ‘A reasonable time’ for 
notification from a retail consumer is to be judged by different standards so that 
in his case it will be extended, for the rule of requiring notification is designed to 
defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of his 
remedy.”); Id. § 2-607, cmt. 5 (2011) (“What is said above, with regard to the 
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no express requirement of prejudice under section 2-607. The court 
would probably apply the prejudice standard of section 2-318 on the 
ground that that represented the presumed legislative intent that all 
tort-warranty claims be governed by section 2-318. To do that, 
however, would again be to do violence to the actual language of 
section 2-318, which speaks of barring recovery “under this section.” 
In the Jacobs case, the court allowed a consumer buyer to sue a 
remote seller directly under section 2-318.400 The issue in Jacobs was 
privity.401 As discussed earlier, it is not certain what the applicable 
statute of limitations would be—the three-year limitation of section 2-
318 applicable to cases brought “under this section” or the four-year 
limitation period of section 2-725 applicable to ordinary contract-
warranty cases. 
The same issue arises with respect to the notice requirement. 
Assume that a consumer buyer wishes to sue a manufacturer (a remote 
seller) for a breach of warranty that caused economic loss. According 
to the Jacobs case, the buyer may do this under section 2-318. The 
buyer, let us assume, is required to give notice to the remote seller. 
The buyer has the right to sue the manufacturer directly under section 
2-318. The buyer’s action is therefore brought under that section. Does 
the prejudice requirement of section 2-318 apply to this case? 
Add to the facts. Assume that the consumer buyer is asserting the 
same contract-warranty claim against both the retailer, his immediate 
seller, and the manufacturer, a remote seller. Assume, too, that the 
buyer sends a notice to both, but the notice is sent unreasonably late. 
Or, for that matter, assume that the buyer sends no notice at all. But in 
neither case does prejudice result. 
The claim against the retailer is a straightforward Article 2 claim. 
The parties are in privity; the buyer’s notice obligations are found in 
section 2-607. The failure to give proper notice “within a reasonable 
time” bars the buyer from any remedy.402 The claim against the 
manufacturer is a non-privity claim, made viable by section 2-318, as 
interpreted by Jacobs. Section 2-318 has an express provision relating 
                                                                                                                                         
extended time for reasonable notification from the lay consumer after the injury 
is also applicable here; but even a beneficiary can be properly held to the use of 
good faith in notifying, once he has had time to become aware of the legal 
situation.”). 
400 Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A, 649 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Mass. 1995). 
401 Id. at 763. 
402 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-607(3)(a) (2010). 
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to notice.403 The failure to give notice under that section bars the buyer 
from any remedy if the defendant proves prejudice.404 
In the Bay State-Spray case, the court stated: 
We would also reject any suggestion that the statute of limitation 
of § 2-318 would apply to an original purchaser’s contract-based 
claim for economic loss as well. To so rule would mean that the 
insertion of the statute of limitation in § 2-318 impliedly amended, 
almost to extinction, the statute of limitation of § 2-725. In such a 
view, the statute of limitation of § 2-725 would have significance 
only as to an action brought in the fourth year after the sale. The 
conclusion that there was an almost total implied repeal of the 
statute of limitation of § 2-725 by the amendment of § 2-318 is not 
easily acceptable.405 
Similarly, the legislature obviously intended the notice provision 
of section 2-318 to be different from that of section 2-607. Under 
section 2-318, there is an express prejudice requirement.406 Under 
section 2-607, there is no prejudice requirement. Section 2-318 puts 
the burden of proving a lack of prejudice on the defendant.407 Under 
section 2-607, the plaintiff has the burden of proving proper notice.408 
The court would probably apply the section 2-607 rules to both 
claims on the ground that they are contract-warranty claims, not tort-
warranty claims. To do otherwise would produce an anomalous result. 
In the Jacobs case, the court ruled as it did to implement the 
purposes of section 2-318.409 In the hypothetical under consideration, 
the claim against the manufacturer is viable because of section 2-318. 
The irony is that one of the express purposes of that section is to 
require prejudice as a condition of establishing the notice defense and 
to put the burden of showing no prejudice on the defendant. Applying 
the notice rules that normally apply to contract-warranty cases is 
contrary to the latter purpose, a conundrum that could have been 
                                                          
403 Id. § 2-318. 
404 Id. 
405 Bay State-Spray & Provincetown S.S., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 533 
N.E.2d 1350,1355 n.8. (Mass. 1989). 
406 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (2010). 
407 See note 241 and accompanying text. 
408 E.g., Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Bloom, 93 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Mass. 1950) 
(Sales Act); 17 RICHARD W. BISHOP, PRIMA FACIE CASE § 13.12 (5th ed. 2012). 
409 Jacobs, 649 N.E.2d at 763. 
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avoided, had Massachusetts acted like a normal state and recognized 
strict tort liability in the product area. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Much of Massachusetts product liability law conforms to the law 
of other states, but the way that law developed has brought about 
anomalies in our law. One of the greatest anomalies is the restriction 
of a “strict tort” liability to warranty law. This has created gaps in the 
law. A manufacturer can introduce a product into the stream of 
commerce, and that product, if defectively made, can injure a person. 
The injured person would have a strict tort claim against the 
manufacturer in an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions. In 
Massachusetts, however, the plaintiff would not have a “strict tort” 
case unless there were a sale or lease that gave rise to a warranty. And 
if the manufacturer had not been negligent, the plaintiff might not have 
a case at all. 
This problem is the result of the product liability amendments or, 
at least, the court’s interpretation of the intent behind those 
amendments. The court should rethink its interpretation of the 
legislative intent in passing the product liability amendments. Those 
well-intended amendments should not be construed as precluding the 
court from imposing strict product liability in cases that do not fall 
under Article 2 or 2A because the underlying transaction did not give 
rise to a warranty. 
It would not be the first time that the court has, at least implicitly, 
refined its interpretation of Massachusetts product liability law. Failing 
that, the legislature should act to fill the gap that it had, perhaps 
inadvertently, created when it enacted the product liability 
amendments. Those amendments have also created problems of 
interpretation with regard to the statute of limitations and, perhaps 
more important, the notice requirement. 
If the notice provision in section 2-318 is intended to impose a 
duty on non-buyer warranty beneficiaries, the legislature has imposed 
an obstacle to recovery that most states do not impose. That is 
certainly an ironic result of amendments that were intended to expand 
the remedies available to persons injured by defective products who 
were not in privity with the seller or manufacturer. 
Apart from the question of a third-party warranty beneficiary’s 
obligation vel non to notify a seller, the product liability amendments, 
as interpreted by the SJC, have prevented the court from recognizing 
strict tort liability. Plaintiffs, therefore, are limited to warranty claims 
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under the Code and are thus still bound by a notice requirement that 
plaintiffs in practically every other jurisdiction do not have to satisfy 
in strict product liability cases. Plaintiffs in those states can simply 
bring a strict tort action. That option is not available to Massachusetts 
plaintiffs. The notice requirement should be abolished in personal 
injury actions. 
Massachusetts product liability law, in very many respects, is 
within the mainstream of American law. But, because of the way 
Massachusetts law has developed, there are still some anomalies and 
quirks that we could easily do without. Life would have been so much 
easier if Massachusetts had simply adopted strict tort liability in the 
first place. 
